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Decision making in goverment tenders: A formalized qualitative model

Author

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  • Štěpán Veselý

    (Ústav ekonomiky, Fakulta podnikatelská, Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Kolejní 4, 612 00 Brno, Česká republika)

  • Mirko Dohnal

    (Ústav ekonomiky, Fakulta podnikatelská, Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Kolejní 4, 612 00 Brno, Česká republika)

Abstract

The paper presents a simple formalized qualitative model of government tenders (GTs). Qualitative models use just three values: Positive/Increasing, Zero/Constant and Negative/Decreasing. Such quantifiers of trends are the least information intensive. Qualitative models can be useful, since GT evaluation often includes such goals as e.g. efficiency of public purchasing, and variables as e.g. availability of relevant information or subjectivity of judgment, that are difficult to quantify. Hence, a significant fraction of available information about GTs is not of numerical nature, e.g. if availability of relevant information is decreasing then efficiency of public purchasing is decreasing as well. Such equationless relations are studied in this paper. A qualitative model of the function F(Goals, Variables) is developed. The model has four goal functions, eight variables, and 39 equationless relations. The model is solved and seven solutions, i.e. scenarios are obtained. All qualitative states, including first and second qualitative derivatives with respect to time, of all variables are specified for each scenario. Any unsteady state behavior of the GT model is described by its transitional oriented graph. There are eight possible transitions among seven scenarios. No a priori knowledge of qualitative modeling is required on the reader's part.

Suggested Citation

  • Štěpán Veselý & Mirko Dohnal, 2012. "Decision making in goverment tenders: A formalized qualitative model," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 397-406.
    • Handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2012060040397
    DOI: 10.11118/actaun201260040397
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    References listed on IDEAS

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