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Les marchés à tranches

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  • Lionel Thomas

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  • Lionel Thomas, 2001. "Les marchés à tranches," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 67(4), pages 437-451.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:reldbu:rel_674_0437
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fernando Branco, 1996. "Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 77-101.
    2. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1988. "Analyse micro-économique du Code des marchés publics," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 39(4), pages 725-752.
    3. Manelli, Alejandro M & Vincent, Daniel R, 1995. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 591-620, May.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    5. Florence Naegelen, 1990. "L'arbitrage qualité-prix dans les procédures d'appels d'offres," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 96(5), pages 95-108.
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