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Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe

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  • Hoekman, Bernard
  • Onur Taş, Bedri Kamil

Abstract

Public procurement regulations aim to ensure the state minimizes contract award prices by specifying the processes to be used in issuing calls for tenders and award of contracts. Cost minimization goals may be complemented by ancillary objectives such as supporting small firms or disadvantaged groups. Recent theory suggests procurement regulations and practices constraining the ability to exercise discretion in awarding contracts may increase average procurement costs. Using detailed data on procurement awards in 33 European countries, we find that restrictions on exercise of discretion are associated with higher average contract prices, and that increases in prices are greater in countries with above average government effectiveness. We also show that realizing price-reducing benefits from exercising greater discretion, where permitted by law, reduces the probability small firms win contracts and continue to do so. Our findings point to a tradeoff between the potential to lower prices by exercising discretion and policies that aim to increase the likelihood SMEs are awarded contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoekman, Bernard & Onur Taş, Bedri Kamil, 2024. "Discretion and public procurement outcomes in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:82:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000272
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102525
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public procurement; Contract prices; Rebates; Discretion; SMEs; Government effectiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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