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De la chandelle aux ventes informatisées. L’organisation des ventes aux enchères de bois des forêts publiques, entre gouvernement des intérêts privés et souci de l’intérêt général (1318-2020)

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  • Marty, Gérard

Abstract

This article focuses on analyzing the shaping of commercial exchange built by public authorities in public timber auctions over the past seven centuries, in order to govern the economic conduct of agents. It describes the succession of the three auction procedures used by the forestry to sell its timber lots. It highlights that the use of these procedures corresponds to three different timescales, whose emergence and disappearance are linked to the action of endogenous and exogenous variables. Finally, it demonstrates that the current choice of the National Forests Office (ONF) to exclusively use the tendering process results from a complex arbitration between its interests and those of the forest-wood sector, to which it must ensure a competitive timber supply.

Suggested Citation

  • Marty, Gérard, 2020. "De la chandelle aux ventes informatisées. L’organisation des ventes aux enchères de bois des forêts publiques, entre gouvernement des intérêts privés et souci de l’intérêt général (1318-2020)," Économie rurale, French Society of Rural Economics (SFER Société Française d'Economie Rurale), vol. 373(July-Sept).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ersfer:335322
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.335322
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2011. "Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 207-257.
    2. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Malédiction du vainqueur et rationalité économique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(1), pages 29-50.
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    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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