IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tse/wpaper/129120.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review

Author

Listed:
  • De Donder, Philippe
  • Bardey, David
  • Zaporozhets, Vera

Abstract

This survey deals with the economic academic literature on diagnostic tests, with a focus first on the determinants of the use of these tests by healthcare providers, and then on the incentives to develop new diagnostic tests. It is structured in four parts. The first part provides general results in this literature regarding how healthcare providers (mostly, physicians) react to the (explicit or implicit) incentives embedded in existing health institutions, and especially to payment schemes and reimbursement rules. The second part deals more specifically with the incentives to use diagnostic tests including, among them, biomarker tests. Both sections follow a positive approach, describing individual reactions to various incentives. The third section rather takes a normative approach and tries to ascertain which incentives should be given to providers to better use existing diagnostic tests. Finally, the fourth section studies the development of new diagnostic tests, both from the viewpoint of the health authorities (when should they be developed?) and of the industry (how to incentivize them to develop the right kind of test?).

Suggested Citation

  • De Donder, Philippe & Bardey, David & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2024. "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review," TSE Working Papers 24-1507, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:129120
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2024/wp_tse_1507.pdf
    File Function: Full Text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2022. "Incentives to implement personalized medicine under second‐best pricing," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(11), pages 2411-2424, November.
    2. J.-Matthias Schulenburg & Martin Frank, 2015. "Rare is frequent and frequent is costly: rare diseases as a challenge for health care systems," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 16(2), pages 113-118, March.
    3. Badi H. Baltagi & Espen Bratberg & Tor Helge Holmås, 2005. "A panel data study of physicians' labor supply: the case of Norway," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(10), pages 1035-1045, October.
    4. Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2021. "Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(6), pages 686-702, September.
    5. Bardey, David & Kembou, Samuel & Ventelou, Bruno, 2021. "Physicians’ incentives to adopt personalised medicine: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 686-713.
    6. Brekke, Kurt R. & Holmås, Tor Helge & Monstad, Karin & Straume, Odd Rune, 2017. "Do treatment decisions depend on physicians' financial incentives?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 74-92.
    7. Léonard, Christian & Stordeur, Sabine & Roberfroid, Dominique, 2009. "Association between physician density and health care consumption: A systematic review of the evidence," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 121-134, July.
    8. Showalter, Mark H. & Thurston, Norman K., 1997. "Taxes and labor supply of high-income physicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 73-97, October.
    9. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    10. Ana Beatriz D′Avó Luís & Mikyung Kelly Seo, 2021. "Has the development of cancer biomarkers to guide treatment improved health outcomes?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 22(5), pages 789-810, July.
    11. Devlin, Rose Anne & Sarma, Sisira, 2008. "Do physician remuneration schemes matter? The case of Canadian family physicians," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1168-1181, September.
    12. Hsu, Jason C. & Schwartz, Eduardo S., 2008. "A model of R&D valuation and the design of research incentives," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 350-367, December.
    13. Tinglong Dai & Shubhranshu Singh, 2020. "Conspicuous by Its Absence: Diagnostic Expert Testing Under Uncertainty," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(3), pages 540-563, May.
    14. Tristan Snowsill, 2023. "Modelling the Cost-Effectiveness of Diagnostic Tests," PharmacoEconomics, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 339-351, April.
    15. Green, Ellen P., 2014. "Payment systems in the healthcare industry: An experimental study of physician incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 367-378.
    16. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    17. Yip, Winnie & Hsiao, William, 2009. "China's health care reform: A tentative assessment," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 613-619, December.
    18. Bardey David & Cremer Helmuth & Lozachmeur Jean-Marie, 2012. "Doctors' Remuneration Schemes and Hospital Competition in a Two-Sided Market," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, November.
    19. Byambadalai, Undral & Ma, Ching-to Albert & Wiesen, Daniel, 2023. "Changing preferences: An experiment and estimation of market-incentive effects on altruism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    20. Mylène Lagarde & Duane Blaauw, 2021. "Effects of incentive framing on performance and effort: evidence from a medically framed experiment," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(1), pages 33-48, September.
    21. Stéphane Alcenat & François Maréchal & Florence Naegelen, 2021. "Implementation of personalized medicine in a context of moral hazard and uncertainty about treatment efficacy," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 81-97, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Galina Besstremyannaya & Sergei Golovan, 2019. "Physician’s altruism in incentive contracts: Medicare’s quality race," CINCH Working Paper Series 1903, Universitaet Duisburg-Essen, Competent in Competition and Health.
    2. Fortin, Bernard & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Shearer, Bruce, 2010. "Labour Supply, Work Effort and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians," CLSSRN working papers clsrn_admin-2010-30, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 21 Oct 2010.
    3. Kurt R. Brekke & Tor Helge Holmäs & Karin Monstad & Odd Rune Straume, 2018. "How does the type of remuneration affect physician behaviour? Fixed salary versus fee-for-service," NIPE Working Papers 09/2018, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    4. Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2021. "Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(6), pages 686-702, September.
    5. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 171-191, January.
    6. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2004. "The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A Literature Review," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2004n29, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    7. Victor Gonzalez-Jimenez & Patricio S. Dalton & Charles N. Noussair, 2019. "The Dark Side of Monetary Bonuses: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Vienna Economics Papers vie1909, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    8. Bejarano, Hernán & Green, Ellen P. & Rassenti, Stephen, 2017. "Payment scheme self-selection in the credence goods market: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 396-403.
    9. Jeannette Brosig‐Koch & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Johanna Kokot, 2017. "The effects of competition on medical service provision," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(S3), pages 6-20, December.
    10. Isabelle Clerc & Olivier L’Haridon & Alain Paraponaris & Camelia Protopopescu & Bruno Ventelou, 2012. "Fee-for-service payments and consultation length in general practice: a work--leisure trade-off model for French GPs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(25), pages 3323-3337, September.
    11. Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2019. "Labour Supply, Service Intensity and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02158484, HAL.
    12. Makris, Miltiadis, 2009. "Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 428-440, August.
    13. Liu, Ting & Albert Ma, Ching-to & Mak, Henry Y., 2018. "Incentives for motivated experts in a partnership," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 296-313.
    14. Chunzhou Mu & Shiko Maruyama, 2013. "Salient Gender Difference in the Wage Elasticity of General Practitioners' Labour Supply," Discussion Papers 2013-16, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    15. Grant Miller & Kimberly Singer Babiarz, 2013. "Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs," NBER Working Papers 18932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Barbara Broadway & Guyonne Kalb & Jinhu Li & Anthony Scott, 2017. "Do Financial Incentives Influence GPs' Decisions to Do After‐hours Work? A Discrete Choice Labour Supply Model," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(12), pages 52-66, December.
    17. Green, Ellen P., 2014. "Payment systems in the healthcare industry: An experimental study of physician incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 367-378.
    18. Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts offered by bureaucrats," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
    19. Jan Erik Askildsen & Tor Helge Holmås, 2013. "Wages and work conditions as determinants for physicians’ work decisions," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 397-406, January.
    20. Florence TOUYA, 2019. "Relevance of Potential Supply Structures in Frameworks involving Consumer's private Information: the Case of Fair Trade," Working Papers 2018-2019_12, CATT - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, revised Aug 2019.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Diagnostic tests; Healthcare systems; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:129120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tsetofr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.