IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ijhcfe/v18y2018i4d10.1007_s10754-018-9239-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Global budgets in Maryland: early evidence on revenues, expenses, and margins in regulated and unregulated services

Author

Listed:
  • Margit Malmmose

    (Aarhus University)

  • Karoline Mortensen

    (School of Business Administration)

  • Claus Holm

    (Aarhus University)

Abstract

Maryland implemented one of the most aggressive payment innovations the nation has seen in several decades when it introduced global budgets in all its acute care hospitals in 2014. Prior to this, a pilot program, total patient revenue (TPR), was established for 8 rural hospitals in 2010. Using financial hospital report data from the Health Services Cost Review Commission from 2007 to 2013, we examined the hospitals’ financial results including revenue, costs, and profit/loss margins to explore the impact of the adoption of the TPR pilot global budget program relative to the remaining hospitals in the state. We analyze financial results for both regulated (included in the global budget and subject to rate-setting) and unregulated services in order to capture a holistic image of the hospitals’ actual revenue, cost and margin structures. Common size and difference-in-differences analyses of the data suggest that regulated profit ratios for treatment hospitals increased (from 5% in 2007 to 8% in 2013) and regulated expense-to-gross patient revenue ratios decreased (75% in 2007 and 68% in 2013) relative to the controls. Simultaneously, the profit margins for treatment hospitals’ unregulated services decreased (− 12% in 2007 and − 17% in 2013), which reduced the overall margin significantly. This analysis therefore indicates cost shifting and less profit gain from the program than identified by solely focusing on the regulated margins.

Suggested Citation

  • Margit Malmmose & Karoline Mortensen & Claus Holm, 2018. "Global budgets in Maryland: early evidence on revenues, expenses, and margins in regulated and unregulated services," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 395-408, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ijhcfe:v:18:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10754-018-9239-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10754-018-9239-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10754-018-9239-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10754-018-9239-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-72, January.
    2. Vivian Wu, 2010. "Hospital cost shifting revisited: new evidence from the balanced budget act of 1997," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 61-83, March.
    3. Waters, Hugh R. & Hussey, Peter, 2004. "Pricing health services for purchasers--a review of methods and experiences," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 175-184, November.
    4. Roger Feldman & Felix Lobo, 1997. "Global Budgets and Excess Demand for Hospital Care," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(2), pages 187-196, March.
    5. Mougeot, Michel & Naegelen, Florence, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 55-72, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Remers, Toine E.P. & Wackers, Erik M.E. & van Dulmen, Simone A. & Jeurissen, Patrick P.T., 2022. "Towards population-based payment models in a multiple-payer system: the case of the Netherlands," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(11), pages 1151-1156.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hung-pin Lai & Meng-Chi Tang, 2018. "Hospital efficiency under global budgeting: evidence from Taiwan," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 937-963, November.
    2. Bradley Chen & Victoria Y. Fan, 2015. "Strategic Provider Behavior Under Global Budget Payment with Price Adjustment in Taiwan," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(11), pages 1422-1436, November.
    3. Carine Milcent, 2014. "Coût des soins hospitaliers : effet de la concurrence par la qualité," PSE Working Papers halshs-01010327, HAL.
    4. Oddvar Kaarboe & Luigi Siciliani, 2011. "Multi‐tasking, quality and pay for performance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 225-238, February.
    5. Grimm Veronika & Zöttl Gregor, 2010. "Price Regulation under Demand Uncertainty," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-34, June.
    6. Carine Milcent, 2017. "Premier bilan de la tarification à l’activité (T2A) sur la variabilité des coûts hospitaliers," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01522581, HAL.
    7. Boone, J. & Douven, R.C.M.H., 2014. "Provider Competition and Over-Utilization in Health Care," Discussion Paper 2014-055, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Chang, Ray-E. & Hsieh, Chi-Jeng & Myrtle, Robert C., 2011. "The effect of outpatient dialysis global budget cap on healthcare utilization by end-stage renal disease patients," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 153-159, July.
    9. Benstetter, Franz & Wambach, Achim, 2006. "The treadmill effect in a fixed budget system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 146-169, January.
    10. Isabelle Clerc & Olivier L’Haridon & Alain Paraponaris & Camelia Protopopescu & Bruno Ventelou, 2012. "Fee-for-service payments and consultation length in general practice: a work--leisure trade-off model for French GPs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(25), pages 3323-3337, September.
    11. Jan Boone & Rudy Douven, 2014. "Provider competition and over-utilization in health care," CPB Discussion Paper 275, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    12. Siciliani, Luigi, 2006. "Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 479-499, May.
    13. François Maréchal & Lionel Thomas, 2019. "The optimal payment system for hospitals under adverse selection, moral hazard, and limited liability," Working Papers 2019-04, CRESE.
    14. Elin Johanna Gudrun Hafsteinsdottir & Luigi Siciliani, 2010. "DRG prospective payment systems: refine or not refine?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(10), pages 1226-1239, October.
    15. Makoto Kakinaka & Ryuta Kato, 2013. "Regulated medical fee schedule of the Japanese health care system," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 301-317, December.
    16. Carine Milcent, 2015. "Tarification et variabilité des coûts hospitaliers : Le cas de l'infarctus du myocarde," Working Papers halshs-01202684, HAL.
    17. Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2014. "The "demand side" effect of price caps: uncertainty, imperfect competition, and ration," TSE Working Papers 14-460, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    18. Robert L. Earle & Karl Schmedders & Tymon Tatur, 2002. "Price Caps and Uncertain Demands," Discussion Papers 1340, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    19. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2009. "Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Outlier Payment Policy," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 177-195, March.
    20. Ma, Ching-to Albert & Mak, Henry Y., 2015. "Information disclosure and the equivalence of prospective payment and cost reimbursement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 439-452.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Global budgets; Maryland; Health care finance; Regulated and unregulated services;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ijhcfe:v:18:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10754-018-9239-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.