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Auctioning wind power sites when environmental quality matters

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  • Ciaccia, Gervasio
  • Doni, Nicola
  • Fontini, Fulvio

Abstract

In this work, we propose an index that allows a public authority to order different projects for the construction of onshore wind energy plants and that explicitly takes into account their environmental quality. Wind farm projects are defined as vectors of four attributes: the technical properties of each project, its social impact, its environmental impact, and the share of earnings that proponents offer to the collectivity in compensation for the negative externalities of the wind plant. We define an absolute index that allows the ordering of different proposals and evaluation of the acceptability of each project, providing the monetary value of each point and inducing a truthful revelation of firms' private information. Moreover, we calibrate the index on the basis of data referring to wind plants in Southern Italy and derive the corresponding iso-scoring curves.

Suggested Citation

  • Ciaccia, Gervasio & Doni, Nicola & Fontini, Fulvio, 2010. "Auctioning wind power sites when environmental quality matters," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 1734-1740, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:4:p:1734-1740
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank Hanssen & Roel May & Jiska van Dijk & Jan Ketil Rød, 2018. "Spatial Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Tool Suite for Consensus-Based Siting of Renewable Energy Structures," Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management (JEAPM), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-28, September.
    2. Iglesias, Guillermo & del Río, Pablo & Dopico, Jesús Ángel, 2011. "Policy analysis of authorisation procedures for wind energy deployment in Spain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 4067-4076, July.
    3. del Río, Pablo & Kiefer, Christoph P., 2023. "Academic research on renewable electricity auctions: Taking stock and looking forward," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Renewable energy Wind power Scoring rule;

    JEL classification:

    • Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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