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Analyse économique des marchés publics dans l’industrie de la construction au Québec

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  • Stéphanie Boulenger
  • Marcelin Joanis

Abstract

Cette étude s’intéresse aux conditions favorisant la concurrence dans l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction, particulièrement aux procédures d’attribution des contrats publics et aux effets de l’ouverture des marchés sur l’incidence de la collusion. Elle s’appuie sur la théorie économique, une revue de la littérature en sciences économiques, une recension d’expériences hors Québec, et une analyse de données. Quatre grands thèmes sont abordés : des éléments d’analyse économique des marchés publics, les marchés publics au Québec, les procédures d’attribution des contrats dans le contexte des marchés publics et les effets de l’ouverture des marchés sur la collusion dans le domaine de la construction. Le rapport se termine par une réflexion sur de possibles réformes des marchés publics québécois.
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Suggested Citation

  • Stéphanie Boulenger & Marcelin Joanis, 2016. "Analyse économique des marchés publics dans l’industrie de la construction au Québec," CIRANO Papers 2016n-01f, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:circah:2016n-01f
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2016N-01f.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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