Asymétries d'information et incertitude en santé : les apports de la théorie des contrats
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DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1997.5861
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1997.5861
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Nicolas da Silva, 2018. "« L'industrialisation de la médecine libérale : une approche par l'économie des conventions »," Post-Print hal-02306255, HAL.
- Nicolas da Silva, 2015. "La nouvelle régulation de la médecine libérale : le salut par la quantification ?," Post-Print hal-01480882, HAL.
- Nicolas Da Silva, 2020.
"Quantifier la qualité des soins. Une critique de la rationalisation de la médecine libérale française,"
Revue française de socio-Economie, La découverte, vol. 0(en lutte), pages 261-280.
- Nicolas Da Silva, 2017. "Quantifier la qualité des soins. Une critique de la rationalisation de la médecine libérale française," Revue française de socio-Economie, La découverte, vol. 0(2), pages 111-130.
- Nicolas da Silva, 2017. "Quantifier la qualité des soins : une critique de la « rationalisation » de la médecine libérale française," Post-Print hal-02306257, HAL.
- Bruno Ventelou, 1999. "Les dépenses de santé des Français : une maladie d'amour?," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 71(1), pages 247-280.
- Philippe Batifoulier, 1999. "Éthique professionnelle et activité médicale: une analyse en termes de conventions," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(2), pages 5-24, June.
- Barile, Sergio & Saviano, Marialuisa & Polese, Francesco, 2014. "Information asymmetry and co-creation in health care services," Australasian marketing journal, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 205-217.
- Sophie Bejean, 1997. "The foundations of the new theories in health economics [Les fondements des nouvelles théories en économie de la santé]," Working Papers hal-01526956, HAL.
- Lydie Ancelot & Cornel Oros, 2015.
"Physician–patient relationship and medical accident victim compensation: some insights into the French regulatory system,"
The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 16(5), pages 529-542, June.
- Lydie Ancelot & Cornel Oros, 2015. "Physician–patient relationship and medical accident victim compensation: some insights into the French regulatory system," Post-Print hal-01233219, HAL.
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