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High-Stakes Grades and Student Behavior

Author

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  • Ulrik Hvidman
  • Hans Henrik Sievertsen

Abstract

High-stakes exams carry important consequences for the prospects of reaching university. This study examines whether the incentives associated with exam grades affect educational investments. Exploiting a reform-induced recoding of high school students’ grade point averages, we identify the effect of highstakes grades on student behavior. The results show that students who were downgraded by the recoding performed better on subsequent assessments. The increase in academic performance in high school translated into an increased likelihood of university enrollment. As the recoding did not convey information about actual performance, these results emphasize that incentives are important in understanding students’ educational investments.

Suggested Citation

  • Ulrik Hvidman & Hans Henrik Sievertsen, 2021. "High-Stakes Grades and Student Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(3), pages 821-849.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:56:y:2021:i:3:p:821-849
    Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.56.3.0718-9620R2
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    File URL: http://jhr.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/56/3/821
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphael Brade & Oliver Himmler & Robert Jaeckle & Philipp Weinschenk, 2024. "Helping Students to Succeed – The Long-Term Effects of Soft Commitments and Reminders," CESifo Working Paper Series 11001, CESifo.
    2. Leschnig, Lisa & Schwerdt, Guido & Zigova, Katarina, 2022. "Central exams and adult skills: Evidence from PIAAC," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    3. Bach, Maximilian & Fischer, Mira, 2020. "Understanding the response to high-stakes incentives in primary education," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2020-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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