The Consequences of Using One Assessment System To Pursue Two Objectives
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- Joshua D. Angrist & Erich Battistin & Daniela Vuri, 2015. "In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Mezzogiorno," Working Papers 747, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Angrist, Joshua & Battistin, Erich & Vuri, Daniela, 2015. "In a Small Moment: Class Size and Moral Hazard in the Mezzogiorno," IZA Discussion Papers 8959, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EDU-2013-07-15 (Education)
- NEP-HRM-2013-07-15 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-URE-2013-07-15 (Urban and Real Estate Economics)
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