Content
September 2007, Volume 132, Issue 3
- 503-504 Neoliberalism: National and Regional Experiments with Global Ideas
by Michael Munger - 505-507 The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865
by Jeffrey Hummel - 509-511 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity
by Roger Congleton
July 2007, Volume 132, Issue 1
- 1-1 A further partial changing of the guard
by Charles Rowley & Robert Tollison - 3-5 Old wine, new wine
by Robert Tollison - 7-26 Israel and Palestine: the slow road to peace or the fast track to mutual annihilation?
by Charles Rowley & Michael Webb - 27-47 Citizen-candidate mobility and endogenous local policy
by Oliver Lorz & Stanislav Nastassine - 49-64 Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players
by Dmitry Ryvkin - 65-84 Strikes are more common in countries with majoritarian electoral systems
by Kåre Vernby - 85-102 Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union
by Christina Schneider - 103-112 The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC
by Henry Chappell & Rob McGregor & Todd Vermilyea - 113-123 Ambiguous political power and contest efforts
by Gil Epstein & Igal Milchtaich & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz - 125-136 Business cycle and political election outcomes: Evidence from the Chilean democracy
by Rodrigo Cerda & Rodrigo Vergara - 137-157 Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits
by Edward López & R. Jewell - 159-178 A race to liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among OECD-economies
by Hans Pitlik - 179-189 Who are the expressive voters?
by Stephen Drinkwater & Colin Jennings - 191-208 Strategic ratification
by Macartan Humphreys - 209-230 Public sector corruption and major earthquakes: A potentially deadly interaction
by Monica Escaleras & Nejat Anbarci & Charles Register - 231-246 Candidate uncertainty, mental models, and complexity: Some experimental results
by Michael Ensley & Scott Marchi & Michael Munger - 247-249 The Logic of Democracy
by John Merrifield - 251-254 Book Review
by Michael Munger
June 2007, Volume 131, Issue 3
- 259-280 Economic and security consequences of supreme values
by Arye Hillman - 281-292 Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered
by Jakob Haan - 293-313 The effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions: Empirical evidence from Spanish municipalities
by Fermín Cabasés & Pedro Pascual & Jaime Vallés - 315-331 Outsourcing in contests
by Frode Meland & Odd Straume - 333-344 The turnout ‘gap’ and the costs of voting – a comparison of participation at the 2001 general and 2002 local elections in England
by Colin Rallings & Michael Thrasher - 345-350 Political economy of the U.S. temporary duty suspension program: An empirical note
by Omer Gokcekus & Amber Barth - 351-364 Choosing a runoff election threshold
by Jeffrey O’Neill - 365-386 Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario
by Kevin Morrison - 387-411 Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election
by Valentino Larcinese - 413-434 The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs?
by Samuel Merrill & James Adams - 435-451 Changing minds? Not in Congress!
by Keith Poole - 453-464 Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest
by Lambert Schoonbeek - 465-468 Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
by Richard Potthoff & Steven Brams - 469-489 Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections
by Gil Epstein & Raphaël Franck - 491-499 Goods or resource contests?
by Martin Kolmar - 501-503 David F. Prindle, The Paradox of Democratic Capitalism: Politics and Economics in American Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. USD 49.95 (cloth)
by Randall Holcombe - 505-507 Beyond conventional economics: The limits of rational behaviour in political decision making
by Bryan Caplan
April 2007, Volume 131, Issue 1
- 1-21 Lobbying, corruption and political influence
by Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni - 23-44 Government transparency and policymaking
by Justin Fox - 45-64 Political business cycles at the municipal level
by Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga - 65-81 Reinforcement vs. change: The political influence of the media
by Ascensión Andina-Díaz - 83-99 Flags of our fathers: Voting on Confederate symbols in the State of Georgia
by Michael Reksulak & Gökhan Karahan & William Shughart - 101-116 Immigration and income redistribution: A political economy analysis
by Karin Mayr - 117-125 Legislature size and government spending in Italian regions: Forecasting the effects of a reform
by Nadia Fiorino & Roberto Ricciuti - 127-140 Inefficient households and the mix of government spending
by Dan Anderberg - 141-155 Political support and tax reforms with an application to Italy
by Paola Profeta - 157-175 The growth effects of fiscal policy in Greece 1960–2000
by Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos - 177-195 The charitable activities of terrorist organizations
by Pierre-Emmanuel Ly - 197-215 Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums
by Randall Holcombe & Lawrence Kenny - 217-242 Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation
by Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet - 243-247 The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all!
by Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller - 249-251 Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism
by Robert Lawson - 253-255 William A. Fischel, ed., The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2006, xxi + 339 pages. USD 30.00 (paper)
by Thomas McCaleb
March 2007, Volume 130, Issue 3
- 251-266 Organized crime and the 1960 presidential election
by John Binder - 267-292 The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world
by Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina Fischer - 293-310 Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence
by John Patty & Roberto Weber - 311-328 Public versus private production and economies of scale
by Henrik Christoffersen & Martin Paldam & Allan Würtz - 329-335 Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment
by Johannes Münster - 337-346 Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation
by Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi - 347-362 A sheriff, two bullets and three problems
by Mike Felgenhauer - 363-380 Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio?
by Peter Schwarz - 381-393 Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy
by Per Fredriksson & Jim Wollscheid - 395-400 1 dictator=2 voters
by Antonio Quesada - 401-436 A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union
by Francesco Lagona & Fabio Padovano - 437-456 Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance
by Eugenia Belova & Valery Lazarev - 457-470 Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply
by Geoffrey Brennan & Michael Brooks - 471-493 Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption
by Omar Azfar & William Nelson - 495-497 Michael Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. xxiii + 214 pages. USD 35.00 (cloth)
by Roy Gardner - 499-501 Gordon Tullock, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2005, 153 + vii pp., 2005. USD 75.00 (cloth)
by Daniel Sutter - 503-503 Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising
by Franklin Mixon & Chena Crocker & H. Black
January 2007, Volume 130, Issue 1
- 1-21 Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison
by Christian Bjørnskov - 23-40 An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts
by Stephen Calabrese - 41-53 Efficient anarchy
by Peter Leeson - 55-77 Another look at anti-scalping laws: Theory and evidence
by Craig Depken - 79-98 Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government
by Reiner Eichenberger & Mark Schelker - 99-114 The tulipmania: Fact or artifact?
by Earl Thompson - 115-128 Why feed the Leviathan?
by Pablo Guillen & Christiane Schwieren & Gianandrea Staffiero - 129-135 A comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The Open Rule Equilibrium and Coalition Formation
by David Primo - 137-162 Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation
by Hanna Ågren & Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk - 163-177 An Empirical Note on Economic Freedom and Income Inequality
by John Carter - 179-207 The Smallpox Eradication Game
by Scott Barrett - 209-223 The debt wish: Rent seeking by business groups and the structure of corporate borrowing in India
by Sumit Majumdar & Kunal Sen - 225-237 The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court
by Saul Brenner & Joseph Whitmeyer & Harold Spaeth - 239-242 Mathias Kifmann on “health insurance in a democracy: Why is it public and why are premiums income related?”
by Wolfram Richter - 243-243 Health insurance in a democracy: A reply to Richter
by Mathias Kifmann - 245-247 Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence
by Peter Leeson - 249-250 Understanding Democracy: An Introduction to Public Choice
by Edward López
December 2006, Volume 129, Issue 3
- 249-262 Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle?
by Burton Abrams & Plamen Iossifov - 263-300 Campaign finance reform and electoral competition
by John Lott - 301-313 Appeasing nihilists? Some economic thoughts on reducing terrorist activity
by Jan Schnellenbach - 315-319 Note on rent-seeking and committees using a proportionate-sharing rule
by Alan Lockard - 321-322 The Design of Rent-Seeking Competitions: Committees, Preliminary, and Final Contests: Corrigendum
by J. Amegashie - 323-352 The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests
by T. Guse & B. Hehenkamp - 353-368 Contests with an unknown number of contestants
by Johannes Münster - 369-380 Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player
by Alexander Matros - 381-398 Public choice principles of redistricting
by Thomas Gilligan & John Matsusaka - 399-415 Community size, heterogeneity and voter turnouts
by Serguei Kaniovski & Dennis Mueller - 417-434 An experimental analysis of voting in the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union
by Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter - 435-460 Do elections lead to informed public decisions?
by Otto Swank & Bauke Visser - 461-474 Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending
by Thomas Stratmann - 475-486 Rent-seeking with scarce talent: A model of preemptive hiring
by Sami Dakhlia & Paul Pecorino - 487-506 Local government internal structure, external constraints and the median voter
by Geoffrey Turnbull & Gyusuck Geon - 507-510 Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government: Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes
by Randall Holcombe - 511-514 Computational and Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences
by Scott Page
October 2006, Volume 129, Issue 1
- 1-23 Endogenous timing of contest with asymmetric information
by Qiang Fu - 25-40 Media scrutiny and the quality of public officials
by Daniel Sutter - 41-60 Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns
by Eric Borgne & Ben Lockwood - 61-75 Is compulsory voting more democratic?
by Keith Jakee & Guang-Zhen Sun - 77-105 Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and 2004
by Ali Akarca & Aysit Tansel - 107-130 The political economy of the European customs classification
by Samia Tavares - 131-157 Politics of Environmental Law: Political Ideology, Elitism or Urban-Rural Interests?
by William Anderson & Daniel Mizak - 159-167 All voting is strategic
by James Buchanan & Yong Yoon - 169-187 A computational electoral competition model with social clustering and endogenous interest groups as information brokers
by Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden - 189-200 Policy innovation in local jurisdictions: Testing for neighborhood influence in school choice policies
by Johannes Rincke - 201-215 Does democracy “suffer” from diversity? Issue representation and diversity in senate elections
by Benjamin Bishin & Jay Dow & James Adams - 217-231 Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success function
by Marco Runkel - 233-237 Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government: Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes
by R. Coats - 239-241 Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities & Limits of Reform
by Brendan Nyhan - 243-246 Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy
by Cathérine Gamper - 247-248 Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee
by Kevin Grier
September 2006, Volume 128, Issue 3
- 357-359 In memoriam: Otto “Toby” Davis, 1934–2006
by Melvin Hinich & Michael Munger - 361-366 Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
by Steven Brams & Michael Hansen & Michael Orrison - 367-381 How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy
by Bryan Caplan - 383-405 Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting
by John Ashworth & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels - 407-431 Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?
by Shanna Rose - 433-455 The committee assignment process as an optimal contracting problem
by Joseph McGarrity - 457-476 Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse
by Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte - 477-498 Vertical Competition in the Spanish National Health System (NHS)
by Joan Costa-Font & Ana Rico - 499-500 A Life Reexamined
by Michael Munger - 501-503 To Form a More Perfect Union: A new economic interpretation of the United States Constitution
by Keith Dougherty - 505-509 For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American Democracy
by Lars Feld
July 2006, Volume 128, Issue 1
- 1-6 Terrorist Attacks on Western Civilization
by Charles Rowley - 7-39 An analytical history of terrorism, 1945–2000
by William Shughart - 41-75 The Israel and Palestine land settlement problem: An analytical history, 4000 B.C.E.–1948 C.E
by Charles Rowley & Jennis Taylor - 77-90 The Israel and Palestine land settlement problem, 1948–2005: An analytical history
by Charles Rowley & Jennis Taylor - 91-107 Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model
by Bryan Caplan - 109-129 Religious extremism: The good, the bad, and the deadly
by Laurence Iannaccone & Eli Berman - 131-146 Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture
by Michael Munger - 147-168 A law and economics perspective on terrorism
by Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi - 169-195 Extremism, suicide terror, and authoritarianism
by Ronald Wintrobe - 197-219 Institutional change in the absence of the rule of law and market mechanisms
by Anne Rathbone Bradley - 221-231 International political system, supreme values and terrorism
by Peter Bernholz - 233-244 Terrorism as theater: Analysis and policy implications
by Tyler Cowen - 245-255 Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists
by Atin Basuchoudhary & Laura Razzolini - 257-274 Designing real terrorism futures
by Robin Hanson - 275-287 Terrorism and pork-barrel spending
by R. Coats & Gökhan Karahan & Robert Tollison - 289-315 The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard & Mogens Justesen & Robert Klemmensen - 317-349 Terrorized economies
by Nicole Crain & W. Crain - 351-356 The several costs of responding to the threat of terrorism
by William Niskanen
June 2006, Volume 127, Issue 3
- 245-250 The normative turn in public choice
by Steven Brams - 251-265 An economic analysis of voting in Sweden
by Henrik Jordahl - 267-284 Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies
by Miltiadis Makris - 285-303 Voting power and voting blocs
by Dennis Leech & Robert Leech - 305-319 Information is important to Condorcet jurors
by Ruth Ben-Yashar - 321-343 Political geography
by Federico Etro - 345-366 Political competition when media create candidates’ charisma
by Ascensión Andina-Díaz - 367-383 Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen
by Brian Goff - 385-405 Market Failures and Government Failures: A Theoretical Model of the Common Agricultural Policy
by Peter Nedergaard - 407-427 The Effects of Regional Sizing on Growth
by Santiago Lago-Peñas & Bruno Ventelou - 429-441 Do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny? evidence from the US States, 1960–1997
by John Bradbury & Joseph Johnson - 443-459 Government Size and Unemployment: Evidence from Industrial Countries
by Horst Feldmann - 461-483 The impact of closeness on turnout: An empirical relation based on a study of a two-round ballot
by Christine Fauvelle-Aymar & Abel François - 485-489 Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya
by Michael Munger - 491-494 The Encyclopedia of Public Choice
by Edward Tower
April 2006, Volume 127, Issue 1
- 1-3 William C. Mitchell: In memoriam
by Randy Simmons - 5-30 The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe
by Roger Congleton - 31-53 Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of disaster relief
by William Shughart - 55-73 Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis
by Russell Sobel & Peter Leeson - 75-95 Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs
by Rune Sørensen - 97-121 Presidential Power over Supreme Court Decisions
by Joseph Whitmeyer - 123-132 Activity and inactivity in a rent-seeking contest with private information
by Lambert Schoonbeek & Barbara Winkel - 133-145 Leviathan in the Crosshairs
by Laurie Bates & Rexford Santerre - 147-175 Can the two new aid-growth models be replicated?
by Peter Jensen & Martin Paldam - 177-206 Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?
by Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo - 207-223 Using state polls to forecast U.S. Presidential election outcomes
by Souren Soumbatiants & Henry Chappell & Eric Johnson - 225-229 Social dynamics
by Adam Gifford - 231-234 Fairness versus welfare
by Paul Rubin - 235-240 The economic effects of constitutions
by Michael Reksulak - 241-243 The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National Politics
by James Hamilton
January 2006, Volume 126, Issue 1
- 1-26 Voting by proxy
by Dan Alger - 27-43 Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
by Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken - 45-73 Consumer capture of regulatory institutions: The creation of public utility consumer advocates in the United States
by Guy Holburn & Richard Bergh - 75-85 Fiscal consequences of public corruption: Empirical evidence from state bond ratings
by Craig Depken & Courtney Lafountain - 87-106 Corrupt political jurisdictions and voter participation
by Gökhan Karahan & R. Coats & William Shughart - 107-134 The political economics of not paying taxes
by Jesper Roine - 135-144 A contest success function with a tractable noise parameter
by J. Amegashie - 145-176 The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain
by Albert Solé-Ollé - 177-199 State budget stabilization fund adoption: Preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints?
by Gary Wagner & Russell Sobel - 201-224 The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation: Winners and loosers
by Rudiger Ahrend & Carlos Winograd - 225-256 Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis
by Danila Serra
December 2005, Volume 125, Issue 3
- 247-269 Policy making in divided government: A pivotal actors model with party discipline
by Josep Colomer - 271-303 Interest group size dynamics and policymaking
by Vjollca Sadiraj & Jan Tuinstra & Frans Winden - 305-337 Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach
by Cecilia Testa - 339-361 Endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime: A bureaucratic incentive model
by Iljoong Kim & Inbae Kim - 363-383 The influence of local and national economic conditions on French legislative elections
by Antoine Auberger & Eric Dubois - 385-407 Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States
by John Bradbury & W. Crain - 409-429 A partisan model of government expenditure
by Thomas Bräuninger