Content
July 2010, Volume 144, Issue 1
- 169-197 Structuring international institutions for the efficient provisioning of global security
by Rupayan Gupta - 199-214 Desperation votes and private interests: an analysis of Confederate trade legislation
by Robert Ekelund & John Jackson & Mark Thornton - 215-238 Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis
by Axel Dreher & Friedrich Schneider - 239-251 Indicators of electoral victory
by Pablo Amorós & M. Puy - 253-274 Expectations of government’s response to disaster
by Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Storr - 275-291 Lobbying and (de)centralization
by Michele Ruta - 293-321 Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy
by Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider & Christoph Schaltegger - 323-346 How does social trust lead to better governance? An attempt to separate electoral and bureaucratic mechanisms
by Christian Bjørnskov - 347-367 Less fighting than expected
by Hannah Hörisch & Oliver Kirchkamp - 369-387 Interaction between federal taxation and horizontal tax competition: theory and evidence from Canada
by Leonzio Rizzo - 389-392 Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast: Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History
by Randall Holcombe
June 2010, Volume 143, Issue 3
- 263-268 Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions
by Michael Munger - 269-273 Elinor Ostrom and the “just right” solution
by John Aldrich - 275-282 In the woods: darkness at noon or Sunday in the park with Lin?
by Thráinn Eggertsson - 283-291 Is the only form of ‘reasonable regulation’ self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens
by Peter Boettke - 293-301 Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
by Michael McGinnis & James Walker - 303-308 Lin Ostrom’s Contribution to Economics: A Personal Evaluation
by Bruno Frey - 309-315 A Noble prize in practical politics: Elinor Ostrom
by Mark Lichbach - 317-324 Common-property resources: privatization, centralization, and hybrid arrangements
by Todd Sandler - 325-326 Elinor Ostrom and the commons
by Robert Tollison - 327-333 Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to the experimental study of social dilemmas
by T. Ahn & Rick Wilson - 335-337 Elinor Ostrom: uncommon
by Kenneth Shepsle - 339-352 Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems
by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
April 2010, Volume 143, Issue 1
- 3-22 Strategic entry deterrence and terrorism: Theory and experimental evidence
by John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt - 23-47 State aid programs for equalizing spending across local school districts: does the structure of the program matter, or only it’s size?
by Vincent Munley & Mary Harris - 49-65 Intra-industry trade and protectionism: the case of the buy national policy
by Dong-Hun Kim - 67-101 Democracy and dictatorship revisited
by José Cheibub & Jennifer Gandhi & James Vreeland - 103-120 Government growth and private contributions to charity
by Thomas Garrett & Russell Rhine - 121-133 Dilatory or anticipatory? Voting on the Journal in the House of Representatives
by John Patty - 135-155 Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries
by Niklas Potrafke - 157-172 Merged municipalities, higher debt: on free-riding and the common pool problem in politics
by Henrik Jordahl & Che-Yuan Liang - 173-189 Fiscal decentralization and the size of government: a European country empirical analysis
by Aurélie Cassette & Sonia Paty - 191-208 Language nuances, trust and economic growth
by Alberto Chong & Jorge Guillen & Vanessa Rios - 209-227 Eminent domain power and afterwards: Leviathan’s post-taking opportunism
by Iljoong Kim & Sungkyu Park - 229-236 Gauging the potential for social unrest
by Oded Stark & Walter Hyll & Doris Behrens - 237-254 Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment
by Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn - 255-256 Erratum to: Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment
by Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn - 257-258 Victor A. Ginsburgh and David Throsby (eds): Handbook of the economics of art and culture
by Friedrich Schneider - 259-261 Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano: Voting and collective decision-making: bargaining and power
by Jean-Michel Josselin
March 2010, Volume 142, Issue 3
- 261-264 Robert D. Tollison, 65 years on
by William Shughart - 265-277 Determinants of publication productivity: an empirical analysis
by Nicole Crain & W. Crain - 279-291 Do differences in presidential economic advisers matter?
by Brian Goff - 293-295 Considering the council’s counsel: Advisor influence and political change
by John Sullivan - 297-313 The progress of the betting in a baseball game
by Raymond Sauer & J. Waller & Jahn Hakes - 315-321 The progress of the betting in a baseball game: A comment
by Chad Turner & Gōkhan Karahan - 323-334 Chivalry in golf?
by Robert McCormick & Robert Tollison - 335-337 On chivalry in golf
by Frank Limehouse - 339-353 National TV broadcasting and the rise of the regulatory state
by Bruce Yandle - 355-361 Television, code law, and integrated markets
by Melissa Yeoh - 363-377 Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?
by Richard Higgins & Arijit Mukherjee - 379-384 Who will deregulate the deregulators?
by Edward López - 385-406 Public choice theory and antitrust policy
by William Shughart & Fred McChesney - 407-408 Public choice theory and antitrust policy: comment
by James Miller - 409-422 The consequences of the US DOJ’s antitrust activities: A macroeconomic perspective
by Andrew Young & William Shughart - 423-428 Antitrust public choice(s)
by Michael Reksulak - 429-436 Interest groups, public choice and the economics of religion
by Robert Ekelund & Robert Hébert - 437-440 A Tollisonian approach to religionomics
by Gokhan Karahan & Michelle Matthews - 441-460 Model of religious schism with application to Islam
by M. Maloney & Abdulkadir Civan & Mary Maloney - 461-464 Nations, taxes and religion: Did Mohammad have it right?
by Aleksandar Tomic - 465-469 Religious schism or synthesis?
by Ahmet Yukleyen & Gokhan Karahan - 471-480 Interest-group analysis in economic history and the history of economic thought
by Robert Ekelund & Robert Hébert - 481-483 Comment on Tollison’s contributions to economic history and the history of economic thought
by Matthew Stephenson - 485-496 After the fall: the impact of government regulation on church attendance in Eastern Europe, 1990–2004
by Anca Cojoc - 497-505 Value of stealing bases in Major League Baseball
by Herman Demmink - 507-513 “Rubbin’ is racin''': evidence of the Peltzman effect from NASCAR
by Adam Pope & Robert Tollison
January 2010, Volume 142, Issue 1
- 1-8 Persuasion, slack, and traps: how can economists change the world?
by Bryan Caplan - 9-23 Not it: opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good
by David McEvoy - 25-39 Social mobility and the demand for public consumption expenditures
by Michael Dorsch - 41-57 Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition
by Huseyin Yildirim - 59-67 Trust and growth
by Oguzhan Dincer & Eric Uslaner - 69-90 Determinants of the probability and timing of commercial casino legalization in the United States
by Peter Calcagno & Douglas Walker & John Jackson - 91-110 Political and institutional environment and privatization prices
by Alberto Chong & Jorge Guillen & Alejandro Riano - 111-124 The policy impact of unified government: evidence from 2000 to 2002
by Nathan Monroe - 125-150 Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states
by Christina Schneider - 151-175 Strategic political commentary
by Todd Kendall - 177-194 A stochastic model of the 2007 Russian Duma election
by Norman Schofield & Alexei Zakharov - 195-213 Government size and growth: Accounting for economic freedom and globalization
by Andreas Bergh & Martin Karlsson - 215-235 Transparency and political moral hazard
by M. Dogan - 237-253 Terrorist networks, support, and delegation
by Kevin Siqueira & Todd Sandler - 255-256 Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai A. Konrad (eds.): 40 years of research on rent seeking 1 and 2
by Randall Holcombe - 257-259 Daniel Treisman: The architecture of government: rethinking political decentralization
by Pierre Salmon
December 2009, Volume 141, Issue 3
- 273-275 The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif
by Avner Greif - 277-290 Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence
by Oleg Smirnov - 291-303 The political economy of smoking regulation and taxation
by Aloys Prinz - 305-317 Clientelism and polarized voting: empirical evidence
by Klarita Gërxhani & Arthur Schram - 319-333 Earning through learning in legislatures
by Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker - 335-349 Productivity growth and funding of public service broadcasting
by Paul Fenn & David Paton & Leighton Vaughan Williams - 351-369 Buying supermajorities in a stochastic environment
by Patrick Hummel - 371-389 Hostile takeover and costly merger control
by Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel - 391-403 Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas
by Gonzalo Córdoba & Alberto Penadés - 405-419 Colonial experience and postcolonial underdevelopment in Africa
by Nobuhiro Mizuno & Ryosuke Okazawa - 421-445 Outsourcing in US cities, ambulances and elderly voters
by Matthew Holian - 447-465 Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature
by Benoît Le Maux - 467-480 War and peace—cyclical phenomena?
by Adam Jacobsson - 481-491 Governance as a strategy in state-of-nature games
by Jason Briggeman - 493-508 Reporting for sale: the market for news coverage
by John Gasper - 509-522 Where have all the heroes gone? A rational-choice perspective on heroism
by S. Blomberg & Gregory Hess & Yaron Raviv - 523-525 Scott Gehlbach: Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States
by Peter Leeson - 527-529 James T. Bennett. Stifling Political Competition: How Government Has Rigged the System to Benefit Demopublicans and Exclude Third Parties
by Claudia Williamson
October 2009, Volume 141, Issue 1
- 1-4 Hobbes and the prophet Samuel on leviathan government
by Arye Hillman - 5-12 Hobbes’s Samuel
by Geoffrey Brennan - 13-15 Hobbes and Samuel: reply
by Arye Hillman - 17-29 A behavioral power index
by Serguei Kaniovski & Dennis Leech - 31-48 Bargaining in the shadow of the ballot box: causes and consequences of local voter initiatives
by Tracy Gordon - 49-63 Tullock’s contest with reimbursements
by Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios - 65-85 Vertical transfers and the appropriation of resources by the bureaucracy: the case of Brazilian state governments
by Nelson Marconi & Paulo Arvate & João Moura Neto & Paulo Palombo - 87-101 Trading policy: Constituents and party in U.S. trade policy
by Nicholas Weller - 103-127 Does economic freedom cause prosperity? An IV approach
by Hugo Faria & Hugo Montesinos - 129-150 Political pressure deflection
by James Anderson & Maurizio Zanardi - 151-165 Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results
by Irem Batool & Gernot Sieg - 167-188 Intergenerational transfers of public sector jobs: a shred of evidence on nepotism
by Vincenzo Scoppa - 189-212 Governance choice on a serial network
by Feng Xie & David Levinson - 213-232 Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition
by Thomas Jensen - 233-267 IMF conditionality: theory and evidence
by Axel Dreher - 269-271 Steven J. Brams: Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
by Nicolaus Tideman
September 2009, Volume 140, Issue 3
- 275-285 The curious citation practices of Avner Greif: Janet Landa comes to grief
by C. Rowley - 287-317 On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009
by Roger Congleton - 319-327 Financial and world economic crisis: What did economists contribute?
by Friedrich Schneider & Gebhard Kirchgässner - 329-340 Deregulation despite transitional gains
by Diana W. Thomas - 341-356 Evolutionarily stable preferences in contests
by Wolfgang Leininger - 357-377 How prices matter in politics: the returns to campaign advertising
by Thomas Stratmann - 379-394 Politicians’ outside earnings and electoral competition
by Johannes Becker & Andreas Peichl & Johannes Rincke - 395-420 Modeling the influence of polls on elections: a population dynamics approach
by Juan Restrepo & Rosalyn Rael & James Hyman - 421-429 A principal-agent approach to a self-administered organization with an elected principal
by Robert Dehm & Berthold Wigger - 431-461 The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment
by Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt - 463-478 Political economy of crime and punishment under Stalin
by Eugenia Belova & Paul Gregory - 479-500 Free-riding on rent seeking—an empirical analysis
by Hartley Furtom & Johannes Sauer & Maria Jensen - 501-501 Free-riding on rent seeking—an empirical analysis
by Hartley Furtan & Johannes Sauer & Maria Jensen - 503-538 Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey
by Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham - 539-542 Donald G. Saari, Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes: Social Choice Analysis
by Michael Munger - 543-545 Glenn R. Parker. Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills
by Justin Buchler
July 2009, Volume 140, Issue 1
- 1-13 Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses
by Walter Block & William Barnett - 15-20 Empirical investigations and their normative interpretations: A reply to Barnett and Block
by Elodie Bertrand - 21-42 Political influence on historical ESA listings by state: a count data analysis
by Bonnie Harllee & Myungsup Kim & Michael Nieswiadomy - 43-58 Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion
by Christian Traxler - 59-84 Can foreign aid reduce income inequality and poverty?
by Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein & Cecilia Calderon - 85-104 A basic tool set for a generalized directional model
by Eric Linhart & Susumu Shikano - 105-124 Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries
by Niklas Potrafke - 125-143 Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment
by Ganna Pogrebna & Pavlo Blavatskyy - 145-160 Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized social trust in large-N collective action
by Kim Mannemar Sønderskov - 161-184 The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach
by J. Aronson & James Dearden & Vincent Munley - 185-204 Leviathan resists: the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance
by K. Arin & Mehmet Ulubaşoğlu - 205-221 Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy
by Per Fredriksson & Herman Vollebergh - 223-244 Attitude-dependent altruism, turnout and voting
by Julio Rotemberg - 245-265 The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions
by Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers - 267-270 David M. Primo, Rules and Restraint: Government Spending and the Design of Institutions
by Michael New - 271-273 William A. Niskanen. Reflections of a Political Economist: Selected Articles on Government Policies and Political Processes
by Philip Porter
June 2009, Volume 139, Issue 3
- 263-272 Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
by Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson - 273-299 Islam’s democracy paradox: Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little?
by Charles Rowley & Nathanael Smith - 301-315 Campaign contributions as a commitment device
by Zacharias Maniadis - 317-333 Seat-vote curves, loyalty effects and the provincial distribution of Canadian government spending
by Vaughan Dickson - 335-342 The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players
by Takeshi Yamazaki - 343-356 It’s the economy, and then some: modeling the presidential vote with state panel data
by Leo Kahane - 357-369 Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding
by Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem - 371-387 Informal institutions rule: institutional arrangements and economic performance
by Claudia Williamson - 389-411 Fiscal adjustments: do labor and product market institutions matter?
by Athanasios Tagkalakis - 413-428 Coalition politics and accountability
by Áron Kiss - 429-441 Does trading votes in national elections change election outcomes?
by Frank Daumann & Alfred Wassermann - 443-459 The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract
by Peter Leeson - 461-492 Choice of law and legal evolution: rethinking the market for legal rules
by Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi - 493-507 Federal, state, and local governments: evaluating their separate roles in US growth
by Matthew Higgins & Andrew Young & Daniel Levy
April 2009, Volume 139, Issue 1
- 1-1 Editorial announcement
by W. Shughart - 3-3 The legacy of Bismarck
by Gordon Tullock - 5-19 Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects
by Leif Helland & Rune Sørensen - 21-37 Pivotal states in the Electoral College, 1880 to 2004
by John Wright - 39-52 (When and how) do voters try to manipulate?
by Sebastian Kube & Clemens Puppe - 53-59 The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion
by Eyal Baharad & Ruth Ben-Yashar - 61-82 Educational business cycles
by Markus Tepe & Pieter Vanhuysse - 83-104 Political decision of risk reduction: the role of trust
by Meglena Jeleva & Stephane Rossignol - 105-119 Factors explaining local privatization: a meta-regression analysis
by Germà Bel & Xavier Fageda - 121-124 Third parties in equilibrium: comment and correction
by Haldun Evrenk - 125-134 The political trend in local government tax setting
by Raffaella Santolini - 135-151 An econometric analysis of counterterrorism effectiveness: the impact on life and property losses
by Konstantinos Drakos & Nicholas Giannakopoulos - 153-158 Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest
by Lambert Schoonbeek - 159-170 More evidence of the effects of voting technology on election outcomes
by Maarten Allers & Peter Kooreman - 171-196 Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase
by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi - 197-225 The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini
by Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt & Carsten Wolf - 227-240 How fair is pricing perceived to be? An empirical study
by Charles Raux & Stéphanie Souche & Yves Croissant - 241-262 Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy
by Robert Deacon
March 2009, Volume 138, Issue 3
- 263-277 Political competition and economic performance: evidence from the Italian regions
by Fabio Padovano & Roberto Ricciuti - 279-299 General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch
by Russell Golman & Scott Page - 301-315 Interest groups and economic performance: some new evidence
by Daniel Horgos & Klaus Zimmermann - 317-345 The life satisfaction approach to valuing public goods: The case of terrorism
by Bruno Frey & Simon Luechinger & Alois Stutzer - 347-366 A model of candidate location with endogenous valence
by Alexei Zakharov - 367-386 Politics and the implementation of public policy: The case of the US military housing allowance program
by Scott Carrell & Janice Hauge - 387-408 Political institutions and debt crises
by Caroline Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder - 409-422 Rent-seeking contests with private values and resale
by Yong Sui - 423-446 Economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes
by Andreas Haufler & Alexander Klemm & Guttorm Schjelderup - 447-460 What explains attitudes across US trade policies?
by Michael Hoffman - 461-474 The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: evidence from a natural experiment
by Marcus Drometer & Johannes Rincke - 475-482 The change in aggregate budget behavior in the 1990s: a cointegration-error correction model analysis
by Paul Blackley - 483-490 Government spending and happiness of the population: additional evidence from large cross-country samples
by Rati Ram - 491-492 Andreas Bergh and Rolf Höijer, eds., Institutional Competition
by Randall Holcombe - 493-494 Wilfried Ver Eecke. Ethical Dimensions of the Economy: Making Use of Hegel and the Concepts of Public and Merit Goods
by Randall Holcombe
January 2009, Volume 138, Issue 1
- 1-2 Rejoinder to “The social sub-optimality of competitive elections: comment”
by Justin Buchler - 3-8 How to avoid transferring a valuable asset
by Sam Bucovetsky & Amihai Glazer - 9-27 The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures
by Yogesh Uppal - 29-44 Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability
by Ronen Bar-El