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Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising

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  • Franklin Mixon
  • Chena Crocker
  • H. Black

Abstract

This study examines the campaign fundraising success of Senate incumbents that have a unique, pivotal status (legislatively) in the Senate with regards to parliamentary procedures (e.g., the filibuster). Regression estimates place the fundraising advantage, in favor of certain pivotal moderates over all other Senators, at about $2.12 million (in real terms) in total contribution per 2-yr election cycle. Pivotal status is even more significant in explaining variations in PAC contribution in the U.S. Senate, given that individuals who make contributions are not likely to be as interested as PACs in ‘buying policy.’ The results also suggest that Krehbiel’s Pivotal Politics (Krehbiel, K. (1988). Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. lawmaking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago press.) construct warrants modification, given that it offers prediction about policy outcomes and gridlock intervals without fully incorporating interest group politics of the ‘vote-buying’ or ‘policy-buying’ variety. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Suggested Citation

  • Franklin Mixon & Chena Crocker & H. Black, 2007. "Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 503-503, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:3:p:503-503
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9100-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Randall Bennett & Christine Loucks, 2011. "Financial Services Industry PAC Contributions and Senate Committee Membership," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 39(3), pages 203-216, September.

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