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Understanding the development of fundamentalism

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  • Gil Epstein
  • Ira Gang

Abstract

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gil Epstein & Ira Gang, 2007. "Understanding the development of fundamentalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 257-271, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:3:p:257-271
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9150-4
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    1. Alam Khan, 2018. "How does terrorism measurement matter of state-level of a country? Evidence from Islamic countries," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 883-898, March.
    2. Patrick Mardini, 2015. "The Endangered Classical Liberal Tradition in Lebanon: A General Description and Survey Results," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 12(2), pages 242–259-2, May.
    3. Fan, Jijian & Friedman, Daniel & Gair, Jonathan & Iyer, Sriya & Redlicki, Bartosz & Velu, Chander, 2021. "A simulation study of how religious fundamentalism takes root," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 465-481.
    4. S. Brock Blomberg & Gregory D. Hess & Akila Weerapana, 2004. "An Economic Model of Terrorism," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(1), pages 17-28, February.
    5. Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2009. "Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 739-757, September.
    6. Friedman, Daniel. & Fan, Jijian. & Jonathan Gair & Sriya Iyer & Bartosz Redlicki & Chander Velu, 2016. "How Fundamentalism Takes Root: A Simulation Study," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1681, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Thierry Deffarges, 2003. "Sur la nature et les causes du terrorisme. Une revue de la littérature économique," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(174), pages 369-392.
    8. Robbert Maseland & André Hoorn, 2011. "Why Muslims like democracy yet have so little of it," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 481-496, June.
    9. Correani, Luca & Di Dio, Fabio & Garofalo, Giuseppe, 2009. "The evolutionary dynamics of tolerance," MPRA Paper 18989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Cerqueti, Roy & Correani, Luca & Garofalo, Giuseppe, 2013. "Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 458-463.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fundamentalism; Rent-seeking; Religion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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