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1 dictator=2 voters

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  • Antonio Quesada

Abstract

For the case of strict preferences, a measure of a voter’s average power in a dictatorial social welfare function is defined making the dictator never have more average power than three voters and, as the number of voters grows, making the dictator average power converge to the average power of two voters. This result suggests, as those in Tangian (2004), that dictatorial social welfare functions might not be as undesirable aggregation rules as traditionally held. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Quesada, 2007. "1 dictator=2 voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 395-400, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:3:p:395-400
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9094-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Greg Fried, 2014. "Taking dictatorship seriously: a reply to Quesada," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 243-251, January.
    2. Antonio Quesada, 2009. "Up/Downward Preference Aggregation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 857-873, October.
    3. Andranik Tangian, 2010. "Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow’s dictators?)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(1), pages 129-161, June.

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