The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all!
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9115-z
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Cited by:
- Dai, Meixing & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2012. "Inflation contract, central bank transparency and model uncertainty," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2371-2381.
- Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2017. "Can inflation contract discipline central bankers when agents are learning?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Enrico MARCHETTI & Giuseppe CICCARONE, 2008.
"Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty,"
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23800083, EcoMod.
- Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," Working Papers in Public Economics 115, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
- Juan Campoy & Juan Negrete, 2008. "Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 197-206, October.
- Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
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Keywords
Central banks; Optimal contracts;Statistics
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