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To Form a More Perfect Union: A new economic interpretation of the United States Constitution

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  • Keith Dougherty

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  • Keith Dougherty, 2006. "To Form a More Perfect Union: A new economic interpretation of the United States Constitution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 501-503, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:3:p:501-503
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9039-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McGuire, Robert A & Ohsfeldt, Robert L, 1989. "Self-interest, Agency Theory, and Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 219-234, March.
    2. McGuire, Robert A. & Ohsfeldt, Robert L., 1986. "An Economic Model of Voting Behaviour over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 79-111, March.
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