The committee assignment process as an optimal contracting problem
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-9009-5
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References listed on IDEAS
- Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
- Coker, David C & Crain, W Mark, 1994. "Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 195-221, December.
- Katz, Jonathan N. & Sala, Brian R., 1996. "Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 21-33, March.
- W. Crain & John Sullivan, 1997.
"Committee characteristics and re-election margins: An empirical investigation of the US House,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 271-285, December.
- Crain, W Mark & Sullivan, John T, 1997. "Committee Characteristics and Re-election Margins: An Empirical Investigation of the US House," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 271-285, December.
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- Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.
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