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Setting lower bounds on truthfulness

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  • Mu'alem, Ahuva
  • Schapira, Michael

Abstract

This paper presents inapproximability results for paradigmatic multi-dimensional truthful mechanism design problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Mu'alem, Ahuva & Schapira, Michael, 2018. "Setting lower bounds on truthfulness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 174-193.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:110:y:2018:i:c:p:174-193
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2014. "Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 29-46.
    2. Nisan, Noam & Ronen, Amir, 2001. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 166-196, April.
    3. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-888, July.
    4. Sushil Bikhchandani & Shurojit Chatterji & Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu'alem & Noam Nisan & Arunava Sen, 2006. "Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1109-1132, July.
    5. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
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    7. Holzman, Ron & Kfir-Dahav, Noa & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 104-123, April.
    8. Shahar Dobzinski & Noam Nisan & Michael Schapira, 2010. "Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(1), pages 1-13, February.
    9. Lavi, Ron & Swamy, Chaitanya, 2009. "Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 99-124, September.
    10. Mu'alem, Ahuva & Nisan, Noam, 2008. "Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 612-631, November.
    11. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
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    14. Itai Ashlagi & Shahar Dobzinski & Ron Lavi, 2012. "Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 37(2), pages 244-258, May.
    15. Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    16. Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
    17. Roughgarden,Tim, 2016. "Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316624791, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Scheduling; Bayesian Incentive-Compatible mechanisms; Truthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms; Randomized truthful mechanisms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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