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A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining

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  • Ortner, Juan

Abstract

This paper constructs a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining to study how fluctuations in bargaining power affect the outcomes of negotiations. The paper deals with the technical complexities that arise when modeling games in continuous time by building strategy restrictions into the equilibrium definition. These restrictions select a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations. This unique equilibrium corresponds to the limiting subgame perfect equilibrium of discrete-time bargaining games with frequent offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ortner, Juan, 2019. "A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 720-733.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:720-733
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "A theory of political gridlock," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    3. Attila Ambrus & Shih En Lu, 2015. "A Continuous-Time Model of Multilateral Bargaining," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 208-249, February.
    4. Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1989. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1171-1214, September.
    5. Bergin, James & MacLeod, W Bentley, 1993. "Continuous Time Repeated Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 21-37, February.
    6. Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 78-95, February.
    7. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
    8. Ortner, Juan, 2017. "Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bowen, Renee & Hwang, Ilwoo & Krasa, Stefan, 2022. "Personal power dynamics in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    2. Bowen, T. Renee & Krasa, Stefan & Hwang, Ilwoo, 2020. "Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining," CEPR Discussion Papers 15406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Continuous-time games; Time-varying bargaining power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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