Contact information of Elsevier
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help
correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Content
2017, Volume 101, Issue C
- 291-310 Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogeneous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
by Keser, Claudia & Markstädter, Andreas & Schmidt, Martin
- 311-333 Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance
by Chen, Roy & Chen, Yan & Liu, Yang & Mei, Qiaozhu
- 334-353 Accounting for noise in the microfoundations of information aggregation
by Linardi, Sera
- 354-378 An experimental analysis of information acquisition in prediction markets
by Page, Lionel & Siemroth, Christoph
2016, Volume 100, Issue C
- 1-23 Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
by Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme
- 24-45 The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence
by Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu
- 46-68 The power of money: Wealth effects in contests
by Schroyen, Fred & Treich, Nicolas
- 69-94 Learning the Krepsian state: Exploration through consumption
by Piermont, Evan & Takeoka, Norio & Teper, Roee
- 95-112 Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
by Shao, Ran & Zhou, Lin
- 113-124 Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma
by Charness, Gary & Rigotti, Luca & Rustichini, Aldo
- 125-141 Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers
by Chaturvedi, Rakesh
- 142-148 Generalized coarse matching
by Shao, Ran
- 149-165 Local incentive compatibility with transfers
by Mishra, Debasis & Pramanik, Anup & Roy, Souvik
- 166-185 On the operation of multiple matching markets
by Anno, Hidekazu & Kurino, Morimitsu
- 186-207 Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
by Janssen, Maarten & Karamychev, Vladimir
- 208-219 An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
by Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip R.
- 220-233 On the licensing of a technology with unknown use
by Badia, Bruno D. & Tumendemberel, Biligbaatar
- 234-239 When does restricting your opponent's freedom hurt you?
by Pei, Harry Di
- 240-256 Reminder game: Indirectness in persuasion
by Suzuki, Toru
- 257-272 Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility
by Acharya, Avidit
- 273-300 Asymmetric employer information, promotions, and the wage policy of firms
by Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel
- 301-320 Vagueness and information-sharing
by Troya-Martinez, Marta
- 321-336 Fractional matching markets
by Manjunath, Vikram
- 337-352 Price competition and reputation in credence goods markets: Experimental evidence
by Mimra, Wanda & Rasch, Alexander & Waibel, Christian
- 353-375 Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation
by Featherstone, Clayton R. & Niederle, Muriel
- 376-389 On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
by Azrieli, Yaron & Kim, Semin
- 390-412 Political disagreement and information in elections
by Alonso, Ricardo & Câmara, Odilon
- 413-430 Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems
by Brusco, Sandro & Roy, Jaideep
2016, Volume 99, Issue C
- 1-22 Duplicative search
by Matros, Alexander & Smirnov, Vladimir
- 23-35 Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
by Baisa, Brian
- 36-55 Collective action: Experimental evidence
by Anauati, María Victoria & Feld, Brian & Galiani, Sebastian & Torrens, Gustavo
- 56-70 Welfare criteria from choice: An axiomatic analysis
by Horan, Sean & Sprumont, Yves
- 71-81 The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information
by Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge
- 82-88 Identification of payoffs in repeated games
by Lee, Byung Soo & Stewart, Colin
- 89-98 On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: A complete characterization
by Qiao, Lei & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Zhixiang
- 99-116 “Giving” in to social pressure
by Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin
- 117-133 Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou–Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games
by Chameni Nembua, C. & Miamo Wendji, C.
- 134-163 Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
by Hatfield, John William & Plott, Charles R. & Tanaka, Tomomi
- 164-179 On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: The importance of credible claims
by Bolton, Gary E. & Karagözoğlu, Emin
- 180-185 A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
by Frug, Alexander
- 186-205 Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study
by Kloosterman, Andrew & Schotter, Andrew
- 206-223 Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
by Cheung, Man-Wah
- 224-238 Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
by Cadsby, C. Bram & Du, Ninghua & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun
- 239-249 Auctions with resale: Reserve prices and revenues
by Virág, Gábor
- 250-256 Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey
- 257-274 A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games
by Chong, Juin-Kuan & Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin
- 275-294 Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
by Nunnari, Salvatore & Zapal, Jan
2016, Volume 98, Issue C
- 1-18 Optimal task assignments
by Balmaceda, Felipe
- 19-33 On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
by Berger, Ulrich & Grüne, Ansgar
- 34-55 Electoral control and the human capital of politicians
by Buisseret, Peter & Prato, Carlo
- 56-67 Evolution and Kantian morality
by Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W.
- 68-77 Monotone strategyproofness
by Haeringer, Guillaume & Hałaburda, Hanna
- 78-109 Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games
by Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries
- 110-134 Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
by Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R.
- 135-164 Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes
by Hota, Ashish R. & Garg, Siddharth & Sundaram, Shreyas
- 165-171 Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
by Doğan, Battal
- 172-179 Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
by Martini, Giorgio
- 180-196 Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: Theory and experiment
by Castillo, Marco & Dianat, Ahrash
- 197-218 What is trustworthiness and what drives it?
by Cox, James C. & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Neururer, Daniel
- 219-234 Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition
by Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A.
- 235-242 Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players
by Zapal, Jan
- 243-263 Quantal response and nonequilibrium beliefs explain overbidding in maximum-value auctions
by Camerer, Colin & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 264-283 Procrastination in teams and contract design
by Weinschenk, Philipp
2016, Volume 97, Issue C
- 1-18 The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness
by Galanis, Spyros
- 19-31 Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in 2×2 coordination games
by Zhang, Boyu & Hofbauer, Josef
- 32-43 Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations – an experimental study
by Greiff, Matthias & Paetzel, Fabian
- 44-53 Sanctions in networks: “The Most Unkindest Cut of All”
by Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber
- 54-63 Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
by Bó, Inácio
- 64-69 Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
by Chen, Peter & Egesdal, Michael & Pycia, Marek & Yenmez, M. Bumin
- 70-87 Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
by Terstiege, Stefan
- 88-109 Cooperation and distributive conflict
by Bayer, Ralph-Christopher
- 110-119 Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs
by Khalmetski, Kiryl
- 120-127 Peer effects and incentives
by Kräkel, Matthias
- 128-146 Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics
by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina
- 147-165 Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
by Tan, Xu
- 166-173 Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations
by He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao
- 174-185 Doing it now, later, or never
by Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, János & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 186-204 An externality-robust auction: Theory and experimental evidence
by Bartling, Björn & Netzer, Nick
- 205-226 The curse of uninformed voting: An experimental study
by Großer, Jens & Seebauer, Michael
2016, Volume 96, Issue C
- 1-17 Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
by de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur
- 18-29 Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences
by Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie
- 30-48 Project selection: Commitment and competition
by Atal, Vidya & Bar, Talia & Gordon, Sidartha
- 49-64 Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
by Kneeland, Terri
- 65-89 Competitive cheap talk
by Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing
- 90-96 Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures
by Morelli, Massimo & Park, In-Uck
- 97-114 Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: A strategic communication experiment
by Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan
- 115-131 The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
by Brown, Alexander L. & Velez, Rodrigo A.
- 132-144 An experiment on a core controversy
by Yan, Huibin & Friedman, Daniel & Munro, David
- 145-169 Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning
by Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas
- 170-183 Objective and subjective compliance: A norm-based explanation of ‘moral wiggle room’
by Spiekermann, Kai & Weiss, Arne
2016, Volume 95, Issue C
- 1-9 Nash bargaining and risk aversion
by Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K.
- 10-24 Participation in moral hazard problems
by Roger, Guillaume
- 25-40 Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
by Manjunath, Vikram & Turhan, Bertan
- 41-46 Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes
by Tamura, Shohei
- 47-58 Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
by Doğan, Battal & Yıldız, Kemal
- 59-72 Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models
by Schenone, Pablo
- 73-87 Solidarity in preference aggregation: Improving on a status quo
by Harless, Patrick
- 88-106 Economics of leadership and hierarchy
by Zhou, Junjie
- 107-112 An ordinal minimax theorem
by Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus & Suksompong, Warut
- 113-136 Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation
by Dietrich, Franz
- 137-155 Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
by Balmaceda, Felipe & Balseiro, Santiago R. & Correa, José R. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E.
- 156-167 Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria
by Athanasoglou, Stergios
- 168-177 Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
by Cho, Wonki Jo
2015, Volume 94, Issue C
- 1-14 Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
by Barelli, Paulo & Duggan, John
- 15-28 Symmetry and impartial lotteries
by Mackenzie, Andrew
- 29-38 Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
by Kalandrakis, Tasos
- 39-56 Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives
by Dutcher, E. Glenn & Balafoutas, Loukas & Lindner, Florian & Ryvkin, Dmitry & Sutter, Matthias
- 57-79 “Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?
by Fu, Qiang & Ke, Changxia & Tan, Fangfang
- 80-96 Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study
by Polonio, Luca & Di Guida, Sibilla & Coricelli, Giorgio
- 97-121 Extremism in revolutionary movements
by Shadmehr, Mehdi
- 122-141 School-track environment or endowment: What determines different other-regarding behavior across peer groups?
by John, Katrin & Thomsen, Stephan L.
- 142-156 Invariance to representation of information
by Yildiz, Muhamet
- 157-168 How to gamble against all odds
by Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron
- 169-181 Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget
by Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas
- 182-187 Monotone equilibria in nonatomic supermodular games. A comment
by Balbus, Lukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Wozny, Lukasz
- 188-190 A global game with strategic substitutes and complements: Comment
by Hoffmann, Eric J. & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 191-199 Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence
by Parravano, Melanie & Poulsen, Odile
- 200-205 Spatial implementation
by Brady, Richard L. & Chambers, Christopher P.
- 206-213 On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
by Yoon, Kiho
- 214-221 Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
by Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng
2015, Volume 93, Issue C
- 1-23 Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections
by Faravelli, Marco & Man, Priscilla & Walsh, Randall
- 24-41 Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
by Naroditskiy, Victor & Steinberg, Richard
- 42-58 Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
- 59-88 Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
by Graham, Brett & Bernhardt, Dan
- 89-107 Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
by Pope, Devin G. & Pope, Jaren C. & Sydnor, Justin R.
- 108-116 Agreeing to agree and Dutch books
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Lehrer, Ehud & Li, Jiangtao & Samet, Dov & Shmaya, Eran
- 117-127 Legislative bargaining with teams
by Bradfield, Anthony J. & Kagel, John H.
2015, Volume 92, Issue C
- 1-17 Decentralized matching: The role of commitment
by Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun
- 18-27 Making just school assignments
by Morrill, Thayer
- 28-40 Persuasion with communication costs
by Hedlund, Jonas
- 41-52 Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
by Hilbe, Christian & Traulsen, Arne & Sigmund, Karl
- 53-73 Personalized pricing and advertising: An asymmetric equilibrium analysis
by Anderson, Simon & Baik, Alicia & Larson, Nathan
- 74-105 Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
by García-Martínez, José A. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando
- 106-121 Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
by Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Breitmoser, Yves & Bolle, Friedel
- 122-137 Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
by Malcomson, James M.
- 138-149 Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
by Szech, Nora
- 150-165 Indirect control and power in mutual control structures
by Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans
- 166-190 Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
by You, Jung S.
- 191-205 Bribing in second-price auctions
by Rachmilevitch, Shiran
- 206-227 Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats
by Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion & Abele, Susanne
- 232-247 A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time
by Bhaskar, Umang & Fleischer, Lisa & Anshelevich, Elliot
- 248-265 How bad is forming your own opinion?
by Bindel, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Oren, Sigal
- 266-305 Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
by Cai, Yang & Daskalakis, Constantinos
- 306-326 Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games
by Cole, Richard & Correa, José R. & Gkatzelis, Vasilis & Mirrokni, Vahab & Olver, Neil
- 327-348 Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games
by Daskalakis, Constantinos & Deckelbaum, Alan & Kim, Anthony
- 349-369 Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert
- 370-400 Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
by Dughmi, Shaddin & Vondrák, Jan
- 401-429 Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
by Hartline, Jason D. & Kleinberg, Robert & Malekian, Azarakhsh
- 430-454 Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
by Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George
2015, Volume 91, Issue C
- 1-13 Competitive economy as a ranking device over networks
by Du, Ye & Lehrer, Ehud & Pauzner, Ady
- 14-25 Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
by de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander
- 26-35 Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem
by He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 36-44 Interim partially correlated rationalizability
by Tang, Qianfeng
- 45-59 Plausible cooperation
by Compte, Olivier & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 60-74 Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
by Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso
- 75-96 Pessimistic information gathering
by Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David
- 97-113 Firing threats: Incentive effects and impression management
by Corgnet, Brice & Hernán-González, Roberto & Rassenti, Stephen
- 114-144 An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
by Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
- 145-165 Strategic disclosure of feasible options
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir
- 166-185 Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
by Arieli, Itai & Levy, Yehuda John
- 186-206 Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment
by Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John
- 207-228 Outside opportunities and termination
by Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi
- 229-236 Time and Nash implementation
by Artemov, Georgy
- 237-257 Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
by Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara
- 258-267 Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners
by Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul
- 268-282 The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
by Lahkar, Ratul & Riedel, Frank
- 284-296 Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
by Ashlagi, Itai & Fischer, Felix & Kash, Ian A. & Procaccia, Ariel D.
- 297-317 The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
by Chawla, Shuchi & Malec, David & Sivan, Balasubramanian
- 318-333 Revenue maximization with a single sample
by Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong & Roughgarden, Tim & Yan, Qiqi
- 334-346 Selling privacy at auction
by Ghosh, Arpita & Roth, Aaron
- 347-359 Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games
by Jiang, Albert Xin & Leyton-Brown, Kevin
- 360-382 Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
by Toulis, Panos & Parkes, David C.
2015, Volume 90, Issue C
- 1-16 Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
by Ortner, Juan
- 17-43 Decentralized matching and social segregation
by Chen, Yan & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Morgan, Peter
- 44-65 A passion for voting
by Panova, Elena
- 66-80 On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence
by Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R.
- 81-92 Posted price selling and online auctions
by Anwar, Sajid & Zheng, Mingli
- 93-105 Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 106-118 Optimal compatibility in systems markets
by Kim, Sang-Hyun & Choi, Jay Pil
- 119-127 Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
by Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve
- 128-133 Sequential cheap talks
by Kawai, Keiichi
- 134-150 Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gómez-Rúa, María & Molis, Elena
- 151-161 Bargaining with non-convexities
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 162-170 Recall and private monitoring
by Phelan, Christopher & Skrzypacz, Andrzej
- 171-180 Ambiguous language and common priors
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Kets, Willemien
- 181-206 Learning about challengers
by Câmara, Odilon & Bernhardt, Dan
- 207-214 Committees with leaks
by Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep
- 215-226 Experimental design to persuade
by Kolotilin, Anton
- 227-246 Auctions with online supply
by Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Roth, Aaron
- 247-256 Stochastic bequest games
by Balbus, Łukasz & Jaśkiewicz, Anna & Nowak, Andrzej S.
- 257-273 Ex post information rents in sequential screening
by Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland
2015, Volume 89, Issue C
- 1-16 Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment
by Filiz-Ozbay, Emel & Lopez-Vargas, Kristian & Ozbay, Erkut Y.
- 17-33 Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W.
- 34-42 Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir
- 43-55 An extension of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time
by Pan, Jinrui & Webb, Craig S. & Zank, Horst
- 56-77 The division problem under constraints
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
- 78-92 The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
- 93-100 X-games
by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/gamebe7.html
