Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.010
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More about this item
Keywords
Quasi-linear preferences; Efficiency; Budget balance; Affine maximizer; Green–Laffont impossibility;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
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