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Content
July 2010, Volume 69, Issue 2
- 346-364 Fairness and desert in tournaments
by Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca
- 365-393 Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
by Halaburda, Hanna
- 394-400 Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
by Heller, Yuval
- 401-410 Flexible network rules for identified externalities
by Navarro, Noemí
- 411-424 Status quo bias, multiple priors and uncertainty aversion
by Ortoleva, Pietro
- 425-445 House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization
by Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku
- 446-457 Leadership games with convex strategy sets
by von Stengel, Bernhard & Zamir, Shmuel
- 458-474 Why income comparison is rational
by Wolpert, David H.
- 475-491 The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
by YIlmaz, Özgür
- 492-497 Costly network formation and regular equilibria
by De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos
- 498-502 A theory of hung juries and informative voting
by Kojima, Fuhito & Takagi, Yuki
- 503-511 Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options
by de Meza, David & Lockwood, Ben
- 512-516 Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games
by von Stengel, Bernhard
- 517-522 Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano, Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power , Cambridge University Press (2008) 184 pages
by Zwicker, William S.
May 2010, Volume 69, Issue 1
- 1-1 A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday
by Dubey, Pradeep & Maskin, Eric & Tauman, Yair
- 2-23 Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents
by Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew
- 24-41 Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data
by Anton, James J. & Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe
- 42-71 Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information
by De Meyer, Bernard
- 72-94 Grading exams: 100,99,98,... or A,B,C?
by Dubey, Pradeep & Geanakoplos, John
- 95-106 Ability and knowledge
by Gossner, Olivier
- 107-126 How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
by Hart, Sergiu & Mansour, Yishay
- 127-137 A commitment folk theorem
by Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov
- 138-149 Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
by Kivetz, Gil & Tauman, Yair
- 150-164 The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)
by Ma, Jinpeng
- 165-168 Complexity and effective prediction
by Neyman, Abraham & Spencer, Joel
- 169-174 Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case
by Samet, Dov
- 175-183 The relationship between quantum and classical correlation in games
by Brandenburger, Adam
- 184-188 All-stage strong correlated equilibrium
by Heller, Yuval
- 189-193 A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
by Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto
- 194-199 On the accessibility of the core
by Yang, Yi-You
March 2010, Volume 68, Issue 2
- 413-427 The logit-response dynamics
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Netzer, Nick
- 428-442 Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
by Andersson, T. & Svensson, L.-G. & Yang, Z.
- 443-468 Preference reversals: The impact of truth-revealing monetary incentives
by Berg, Joyce E. & Dickhaut, John W. & Rietz, Thomas A.
- 469-487 Peace agreements without commitment
by Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C.
- 488-511 Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study
by Blume, Andreas & Gneezy, Uri
- 512-531 On effectivity functions of game forms
by Boros, Endre & Elbassioni, Khaled & Gurvich, Vladimir & Makino, Kazuhisa
- 532-550 Clock games: Theory and experiments
by Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Morgan, John
- 551-556 On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: New experimental evidence regarding Linda
by Charness, Gary & Karni, Edi & Levin, Dan
- 557-579 Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
by Chen, Yan & Takeuchi, Kan
- 580-601 Sharing information in Web communities
by Demange, Gabrielle
- 602-613 Partial exposure in large games
by Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer
- 614-625 Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior
by Haisley, Emily C. & Weber, Roberto A.
- 626-633 The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
by Herings, P.J.J. & van der Laan, G. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.
- 634-645 Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions - How (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
by Lange, Andreas & Ratan, Anmol
- 646-669 Optimal collusion with internal contracting
by Lee, Gea M.
- 670-682 Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
by Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah & Shmaya, Eran
- 683-688 Simple complexity from imitation games
by McLennan, Andrew & Tourky, Rabee
- 689-702 Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
by Nikiforakis, Nikos
- 703-715 Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
by Parreiras, Sérgio O. & Rubinchik, Anna
- 716-730 Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback
by Rick, Scott & Weber, Roberto A.
- 731-747 Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
by Sheremeta, Roman M.
- 748-762 Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
by Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung
- 763-772 On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
by Carbajal, Juan Carlos
- 773-780 Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
by Kominers, Scott Duke
- 781-788 The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships
by Rasul, Imran & Sonderegger, Silvia
- 789-792 Games and science
by Heifetz, Aviad
January 2010, Volume 68, Issue 1
- 1-14 A sequential selection game with vetoes
by Alpern, Steve & Gal, Shmuel & Solan, Eilon
- 15-22 Simple games with many effective voters
by Beigman, Eyal
- 23-34 Pre-match investment with frictions
by Bidner, Chris
- 35-49 Secure implementation in allotment economies
by Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka
- 50-59 Discrimination in the lab: Does information trump appearance?
by Castillo, Marco & Petrie, Ragan
- 60-76 Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence
by Damianov, Damian S. & Oechssler, Jörg & Becker, Johannes Gerd
- 77-94 On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium
by Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin
- 95-107 Testing guilt aversion
by Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute
- 108-129 When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
by Friedenberg, Amanda
- 130-143 Perception of probabilities in situations of risk: A case based approach
by Gayer, Gabrielle
- 144-154 Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
by Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny
- 155-179 Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
by Halpern, Joseph Y.
- 180-191 Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
by Herold, Florian
- 192-207 Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly
by Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Roy, Santanu
- 208-219 Risk aversion and expected utility of consumption over time
by Johansson-Stenman, Olof
- 220-232 Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
by KayI, Çagatay & Ramaekers, Eve
- 233-241 Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules
by KIbrIs, Özgür & TapkI, Ipek Gürsel
- 242-254 Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
by Kim, Chongmin & Wong, Kam-Chau
- 255-274 Moral norms in a partly compliant society
by Kranz, Sebastian
- 275-302 Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
by Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves
- 303-324 Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment
by Ramsza, Michal & Seymour, Robert M.
- 325-338 Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context
by Rode, Julian
- 339-352 Attribution and reciprocity
by Sebald, Alexander
- 353-375 Public information and electoral bias
by Taylor, Curtis R. & Yildirim, Huseyin
- 376-380 On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
by Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël & Rajan, Uday
- 381-388 Polytopes and the existence of approximate equilibria in discontinuous games
by Carmona, Guilherme
- 389-402 Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure
by Chen, Yi-Chun
- 403-410 The possibility of impossible stairways: Tail events and countable player sets
by Voorneveld, Mark
- 411-411 Behavioral & Quantitative Game Theory Conference on Future Directions May 14-16, 2010, Fairmont Hotel, Newport Beach, CA
by Dror, Moshe & Sosic, Greys
November 2009, Volume 67, Issue 2
- 335-350 Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities
by Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G.
- 351-362 Categorizing others in a large game
by Azrieli, Yaron
- 363-375 Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
by Barelli, Paulo
- 376-388 Cooperation through imitation
by Bergin, James & Bernhardt, Dan
- 389-398 Games played in a contracting environment
by Bhaskar, V.
- 399-407 Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
by Engelmann, Dirk & Fischbacher, Urs
- 408-427 Subjective states: A more robust model
by Epstein, Larry G. & Seo, Kyoungwon
- 428-444 Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
by Freixas, Josep & Zwicker, William S.
- 445-466 In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents
by Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno & Ule, Aljaz
- 467-480 Reciprocity and voting
by Hahn, Volker
- 481-502 Self-reinforcing market dominance
by Halbheer, Daniel & Fehr, Ernst & Goette, Lorenz & Schmutzler, Armin
- 503-525 Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Rêgo, Leandro C.
- 526-541 Farsightedly stable networks
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent
- 542-551 Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
by Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph
- 552-568 Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status
by Hopkins, Ed & Kornienko, Tatiana
- 569-583 Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
by Lagunoff, Roger
- 584-597 Contests with a stochastic number of players
by Lim, Wooyoung & Matros, Alexander
- 598-610 A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
by Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles
- 611-615 Sequential, nonzero-sum "Blotto": Allocating defensive resources prior to attack
by Powell, Robert
- 616-632 Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test
by Rutström, E. Elisabet & Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
- 633-644 On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
by Shellshear, Evan & Sudhölter, Peter
- 645-664 Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences
by Shunda, Nicholas
- 665-681 Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
by Suvorov, Anton & van de Ven, Jeroen
- 682-694 Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
by Tomala, Tristan
- 695-707 Cost sharing with multiple technologies
by Trudeau, Christian
- 708-719 The target projection dynamic
by Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark
- 720-735 Fully sincere voting
by Wolitzky, Alexander
- 736-744 Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
by Guembel, Alexander & Rossetto, Silvia
- 745-749 Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
by Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito
- 750-757 Weighted congestion games with separable preferences
by Milchtaich, Igal
September 2009, Volume 67, Issue 1
- 1-1 Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
by Parkes, David C. & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 2-21 Mediators in position auctions
by Ashlagi, Itai & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 22-35 Congestion games with malicious players
by Babaioff, Moshe & Kleinberg, Robert & Papadimitriou, Christos H.
- 36-50 Trading networks with price-setting agents
by Blume, Lawrence E. & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Tardos, Éva
- 51-68 Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
by Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay
- 69-98 Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
by Guo, Mingyu & Conitzer, Vincent
- 99-124 Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
by Lavi, Ron & Swamy, Chaitanya
- 125-155 Beyond Moulin mechanisms
by Mehta, Aranyak & Roughgarden, Tim & Sundararajan, Mukund
- 156-173 Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources
by Penn, Michal & Polukarov, Maria & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 174-190 Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism
by Sharma, Yogeshwer & Williamson, David P.
- 191-216 Elections with platform and valence competition
by Ashworth, Scott & Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan
- 217-232 Membership in citizen groups
by Barbieri, Stefano & Mattozzi, Andrea
- 233-244 Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment
by Bellemare, Charles & Shearer, Bruce
- 245-252 Competitive environments and protective behavior
by Borm, Peter & Estévez-Fernández, Arantza & Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria
- 253-265.3 Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods
by Botelho, Anabela & Harrison, Glenn W. & Pinto, Lígia M. Costa & Rutström, Elisabet E.
- 266-276 Stable allocations of risk
by Csóka, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Kóczy, László Á.
- 277-291 The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments
by Fong, Yuk-fai & Surti, Jay
- 292-299 Private provision of discrete public goods
by Makris, Miltiadis
- 300-314 Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade
by Mandler, Michael
- 315-330 Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit
by Virág, Gábor
- 331-333 On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets
by Stamatopoulos, Giorgos & Tauman, Tami
July 2009, Volume 66, Issue 2
- 581-581 In memoriam: David Gale (1921-2008)
by Sobel, Joel & von Stengel, Bernhard
- 582-593 The Berkeley Memorial
by Weinstein, Alan & Kuhn, Harold & Goodman, Leo A. & McFadden, Dan & Sobel, Joel & Adler, Ilan & Feldman, Jacob & Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, Katharine & Dunning, Elizabeth & Watkiss, Samara & Gilbert, Roger & Birt, Jonathan & Ingham, Graham & Gilbert, Sandra M.
- 594-597 David Gale in Paris
by Balinski, Michel & Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvan
- 598-598 The Galetron
by Berlekamp, Elwyn
- 599-599 More Gale Tales
by Brock, William A. Buz
- 600-600 Sex and the mathematician: The High School Prom Theorem
by Davis, Martin
- 601-602 David in Paris
by Demange, Gabrielle
- 603-605 Two lemmas that changed general equilibrium theory
by Florenzano, Monique
- 606-606 My memories of David Gale
by Karp, Richard
- 607-626 Equilibrium and optimality: Some imprints of David Gale
by Majumdar, Mukul
- 627-627 Gale at Princeton
by Nash Jr., John F.
- 628-629 Remembering David Gale
by Osserman, Robert
- 630-631 My introduction to top-trading cycles
by Scarf, Herbert
- 632-642 ReGale: Some memorable results
by Sobel, Joel
- 643-646 My encounters with David Gale
by Sotomayor, Marilda
- 647-656 Topological games at Princeton, a mathematical memoir
by Gale, David
- 660-684 Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
by Babaioff, Moshe & Nisan, Noam & Pavlov, Elan
- 685-707 On the benefits of party competition
by Bernhardt, Dan & Campuzano, Larissa & Squintani, Francesco & Câmara, Odilon
- 708-720 Commitment and observability in a contracting environment
by Bhaskar, V.
- 721-728 Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
by Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar
- 729-741 All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction
by Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul & Lafky, Jonathan & Münster, Johannes & Zhang, Meixia
- 742-748 The aggregate-monotonic core
by Calleja, Pedro & Rafels, Carles & Tijs, Stef
- 749-760 Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection
by Carmona, Guilherme & Fajardo, José
- 761-774 Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints
by Conley, John P. & Neilson, William
- 775-784 Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games
by De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos
- 785-812 Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
by Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack
- 813-829 Equilibrium vengeance
by Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar
- 830-840 When curiosity kills the profits: An experimental examination
by Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean S.
- 841-854 Repeated signaling games
by Kaya, Ayça
- 855-864 Auctions in which losers set the price
by Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsetlin, Ilia
- 865-879 Rapid evolution under inertia
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 880-892 A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
by Özyurt, Selçuk & Sanver, M. Remzi
- 893-919 Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
by Picard, Pierre
- 920-927 Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games
by Pimienta, Carlos
- 928-949 Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
by Pitchik, Carolyn
- 950-958 A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence
by Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 959-978 Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium
by Rauh, Michael T.
- 979-994 Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
by Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas
- 995-1004 Approachability with bounded memory
by Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon
May 2009, Volume 66, Issue 1
- 1-26 Price and capacity competition
by Acemoglu, Daron & Bimpikis, Kostas & Ozdaglar, Asuman
- 27-38 Non-hyperbolic time inconsistency
by Bleichrodt, Han & Rohde, Kirsten I.M. & Wakker, Peter P.
- 39-56 Communication networks with endogenous link strength
by Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar
- 57-77 Disputed lands
by Dall'Aglio, Marco & Maccheroni, Fabio
- 78-97 Bargaining over bets
by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
- 98-114 Random matching in adaptive dynamics
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A.
- 115-125 Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
by Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay
- 126-145 Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
by Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés
- 146-161 The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests
by Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng
- 162-190 Tournaments with midterm reviews
by Gershkov, Alex & Perry, Motty
- 191-201 Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the Matching Pennies game
by Gorodeisky, Ziv
- 202-220 Cooperation in viscous populations--Experimental evidence
by Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike
- 221-237 Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
by Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan
- 238-255 Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
by Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu
- 256-274 Multi-battle contests
by Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan
- 275-291 Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
by Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K.
- 292-314 Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
by Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu
- 315-325 Approachability in repeated games: Computational aspects and a Stackelberg variant
by Mannor, Shie & Tsitsiklis, John N.
- 326-347 Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
by Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C.
- 348-372 Network architecture and traffic flows: Experiments on the Pigou-Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes
by Morgan, John & Orzen, Henrik & Sefton, Martin
- 373-393 Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab
by Müller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi & Yehezkel, Yaron
- 394-403 A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences
by Neilson, William S.
- 404-425 Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
by Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro
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