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Content
2013, Volume 81, Issue C
2013, Volume 80, Issue C
- 1-9 An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
by Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe
- 10-38 Reinforcement learning in population games
by Lahkar, Ratul & Seymour, Robert M.
- 39-67 Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
by Kreindler, Gabriel E. & Young, H. Peyton
- 68-84 Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements
by Miettinen, Topi
- 85-99 On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws
by Kıbrıs, Özgür & Kıbrıs, Arzu
- 100-114 A dynamic school choice model
by Pereyra, Juan Sebastián
- 115-130 Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication
by Carpenter, Jeffrey & Graham, Michael & Wolf, Jesse
- 131-146 Biased social learning
by Herrera, Helios & Hörner, Johannes
- 147-156 The e-mail game phenomenon
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang
- 157-178 Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
by Goldlücke, Susanne & Kranz, Sebastian
- 179-185 The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models
by Kamada, Yuichiro & Kojima, Fuhito
- 186-192 Conservative belief and rationality
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael
- 193-208 Competition for procurement shares
by Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias
- 209-218 Harmful signaling in matching markets
by Kushnir, Alexey
- 219-228 Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
by Sudhölter, Peter & Zarzuelo, José M.
- 229-242 Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
by Csapó, Gergely & Müller, Rudolf
- 243-261 Pricing in social networks
by Bloch, Francis & Quérou, Nicolas
2013, Volume 79, Issue C
- 1-29 Dynamics in tree formation games
by Arcaute, E. & Dyagilev, K. & Johari, R. & Mannor, S.
- 30-43 Network design and defence
by Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev
- 44-55 Shunning uncertainty: The neglect of learning opportunities
by Trautmann, Stefan T. & Zeckhauser, Richard J.
- 56-66 Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences
by Hernández, Penélope & Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel & Sánchez, Ángel
- 67-74 Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata
by Andreozzi, Luciano
- 75-89 Social comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence
by McDonald, Ian M. & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Olekalns, Nilss & Sibly, Hugh
- 92-105 Auctions with entry and resale
by Xu, Xiaoshu & Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin
- 106-131 Sources of variation in social networks
by Atalay, Enghin
- 132-147 The value of recommendations
by Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Schumacher, Heiner
- 148-162 Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
by Rivas, Javier
- 163-180 Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach
by Capraro, Valerio & Scarsini, Marco
- 181-191 Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
by McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing
- 192-200 Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
by Samet, Dov
- 201-222 Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
by Piccolo, Salvatore & Pagnozzi, Marco
- 223-232 Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games
by McKinney, C. Nicholas & Van Huyck, John B.
2013, Volume 78, Issue C
- 1-20 Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding
by Pearson, Matthew & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 21-30 The informational divide
by Nermuth, Manfred & Pasini, Giacomo & Pin, Paolo & Weidenholzer, Simon
- 31-43 A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals
by Bonanno, Giacomo
- 44-63 How to win a large election
by Mandler, Michael
- 64-71 A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
by Forges, Françoise
- 72-84 Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition
by Saran, Rene & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
- 85-102 Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
by Hummel, Patrick
- 103-120 Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information
by Jacquemet, Nicolas & Koessler, Frédéric
2013, Volume 77, Issue 1
- 1-20 Optimal allocation without transfer payments
by Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R.
- 21-40 Admissibility and event-rationality
by Barelli, Paulo & Galanis, Spyros
- 41-60 Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control
by Maximiano, Sandra & Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep
- 61-76 Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle
by Ke, Changxia & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian
- 77-89 Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information
by Aoyagi, Masaki
- 90-99 Choice by sequential procedures
by Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A.
- 100-121 Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
by Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 122-137 Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
by Reuben, Ernesto & Riedl, Arno
- 138-152 To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria
by Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
- 153-167 The communication burden of payment determination
by Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Schapira, Michael
- 168-180 Minimax play by teams
by Okano, Yoshitaka
- 181-213 Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man?
by Chen, Yan & Katuščák, Peter & Ozdenoren, Emre
- 214-228 Bribing in first-price auctions
by Rachmilevitch, Shiran
- 229-246 The effect of link costs on simple buyer–seller networks
by Doğan, Gönül & van Assen, Marcel & Potters, Jan
- 247-270 Auctions with a profit sharing contract
by Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R.
- 271-283 Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation
by Faillo, Marco & Grieco, Daniela & Zarri, Luca
- 284-297 Truth, justice, and cake cutting
by Chen, Yiling & Lai, John K. & Parkes, David C. & Procaccia, Ariel D.
- 298-320 Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems
by Kováč, Eugen & Steiner, Jakub
- 321-344 Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience
by Xiao, Erte
- 345-351 Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
by Britz, Volker
- 352-366 Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
by Ortner, Juan
- 367-376 Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
by Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen
- 377-404 Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types
by Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang
2012, Volume 76, Issue 2
- 355-374 On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game
by Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees
- 375-390 Justifiable choice
by Heller, Yuval
- 391-419 On dynamic compromise
by Bowen, T. Renee & Zahran, Zaki
- 420-438 Smooth multibidding mechanisms
by Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas
- 439-456 Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
by Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal
- 457-470 Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences
by Buser, Thomas
- 471-494 Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework
by Dietrich, Franz
- 495-514 Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study
by Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick
- 519-534 Coordination need not be a problem
by Dutta, Prajit K.
- 535-547 Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
by Terstiege, Stefan
- 548-555 Social norms and trust among strangers
by Xie, Huan & Lee, Yong-Ju
- 556-570 The probability of nontrivial common knowledge
by Collevecchio, Andrea & LiCalzi, Marco
- 571-581 A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
by Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru
- 582-595 When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico
- 596-610 Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration
by Rong, Kang
- 611-635 Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
by Chernomaz, Kirill & Levin, Dan
- 636-647 Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
by Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori
- 648-664 Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
by Zheng, Charles Z.
- 665-677 Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value
by Hinojosa, M.A. & Romero, E. & Zarzuelo, J.M.
- 678-689 Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly
by Engelmann, Dirk & Strobel, Martin
- 690-710 On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study
by Chernomaz, Kirill
- 711-737 A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
by Laclau, Marie
- 738-752 Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
by Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo & Vila, José E.
- 753-772 Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
by Martimort, David & Stole, Lars
2012, Volume 76, Issue 1
- 1-14 Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria
by Babichenko, Yakov
- 15-25 Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
by Burguet, Roberto & Ganuza, Juan-José & Hauk, Esther
- 26-43 Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
by Cason, Timothy N. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Zhang, Jingjing
- 44-73 Learning in experimental 2×2 games
by Chmura, Thorsten & Goerg, Sebastian J. & Selten, Reinhard
- 74-87 Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
by Du, Songzi
- 88-96 Unbeatable imitation
by Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 97-116 Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
by Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack
- 117-130 Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
by Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara
- 131-159 Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
by Elmaghraby, Wedad J. & Larson, Nathan
- 160-180 New characterizations for largeness of the core
by Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
- 181-194 Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
by Filiz-Ozbay, Emel
- 195-209 Competition fosters trust
by Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert
- 210-225 Non-Bayesian social learning
by Jadbabaie, Ali & Molavi, Pooya & Sandroni, Alvaro & Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza
- 226-248 Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps
by Kirkegaard, René
- 249-271 Political competition between differentiated candidates
by Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K.
- 272-284 Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games
by Man, Priscilla T.Y.
- 285-300 Strategy-proof partitioning
by Mishra, Debasis & Roy, Souvik
- 301-328 Competing conventions
by Neary, Philip R.
- 329-339 Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium
by Sun, Yeneng & Wu, Lei & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 340-343 A correction to “Large games and the law of large numbers” [Games Econom. Behav. 64 (2008) 1–34]
by Tolvanen, Juha & Soultanis, Elefterios
- 344-348 Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
by van den Brink, René
- 349-353 Characterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
by Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan
2012, Volume 75, Issue 2
- 449-463 Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study
by Agranov, Marina & Potamites, Elizabeth & Schotter, Andrew & Tergiman, Chloe
- 464-480 Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
by Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 481-489 Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity
by Baillon, Aurélien & Driesen, Bram & Wakker, Peter P.
- 490-509 Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo
- 510-517 A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games
by Blume, Andreas
- 518-537 Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
by Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
- 538-554 Stochastic stability in best shot network games
by Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo
- 555-569 Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests
by Breitmoser, Yves
- 570-586 Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment
by Camera, Gabriele & Casari, Marco & Bigoni, Maria
- 587-597 A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
by Chen, Yi-Chun
- 598-612 Transparency, complementarity and holdout
by Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal
- 613-624 What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals
by Condorelli, Daniele
- 625-638 A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
by Dominiak, Adam & Duersch, Peter & Lefort, Jean-Philippe
- 639-645 Testing substitutability
by Hatfield, John William & Immorlica, Nicole & Kominers, Scott Duke
- 646-667 Deliberative democracy and electoral competition
by Hummel, Patrick
- 668-684 Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
by Jara-Moroni, Pedro
- 685-693 School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
by Kojima, Fuhito
- 694-713 The efficiency and stability of R&D networks
by König, Michael D. & Battiston, Stefano & Napoletano, Mauro & Schweitzer, Frank
- 714-730 On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
by Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin
- 731-751 Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
by Lebrun, Bernard
- 752-775 Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks
by Lelarge, Marc
- 776-787 Influence networks
by López-Pintado, Dunia
- 788-808 Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
by Marden, Jason R. & Shamma, Jeff S.
- 809-831 Comparative statics of altruism and spite
by Milchtaich, Igal
- 832-841 A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism
by Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Roemer, John E.
- 842-854 Coalitional stochastic stability
by Newton, Jonathan
- 855-866 Mean and variance responsive learning
by Oyarzun, Carlos & Sarin, Rajiv
- 867-881 The influence relation for ternary voting games
by Parker, Cameron
- 882-897 Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
by Pradelski, Bary S.R. & Young, H. Peyton
- 898-920 Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz
- 921-935 Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
by Spiliopoulos, Leonidas
- 936-947 Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
by Troyan, Peter
- 948-963 Let them cheat!
by Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William
- 964-983 Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
by Zhao, Rui R.
- 984-989 On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
by Kominers, Scott Duke
- 990-999 On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
by Lamy, Laurent
- 1000-1008 Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment
by Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W.
- 1009-1013 Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
by Suzuki, Toru
- 1014-1024 Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
by Weidenholzer, Simon
2012, Volume 75, Issue 1
- 1-16 Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks
by Abreu, Dilip & Manea, Mihai
- 17-34 Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory
by Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian
- 35-52 Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence
by Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion
- 53-66 Potential competition in preemption games
by Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas
- 67-80 Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias
by Bracha, Anat & Brown, Donald J.
- 81-103 From perception to action: An economic model of brain processes
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D.
- 104-119 Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
by Daley, Brendan & Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin
- 120-138 Oligopolistic competition in price and quality
by Dubovik, Andrei & Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- 139-151 Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms
by Friedman, Eric J.
- 152-167 Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem
by Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio
- 168-184 Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models
by Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire
- 185-197 Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
by Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien
- 198-216 Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu
- 217-232 Profit-maximizing matchmaker
by Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo
- 233-249 Communication and efficiency in auctions
by Kos, Nenad
- 250-264 Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment
by Mak, Vincent & Rapoport, Amnon & Gisches, Eyran J.
- 265-276 Forward induction equilibrium
by Man, Priscilla T.Y.
- 277-282 Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample
by Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis
- 283-298 Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach
by Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava
- 299-318 Evolution of theories of mind
by Mohlin, Erik
- 319-336 Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
by Non, Arjan
- 337-353 Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
by Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 354-371 Learning in games with risky payoffs
by Shafran, Aric P.
- 372-401 Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
by Staudigl, Mathias
- 402-412 A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems
by Trudeau, Christian
- 413-423 Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 424-427 Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria
by Fey, Mark
- 428-434 Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
by Kumano, Taro & Watabe, Masahiro
- 435-440 Two-person ex post implementation
by Ohashi, Yoshihiro
- 441-447 Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
by Shimoji, Makoto
2012, Volume 74, Issue 2
- 447-469 The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting
by Brusco, Sandro & Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep
- 470-485 Buyer groups as strategic commitments
by Dana, James D.
- 486-503 Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam
- 504-516 Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters
by Fujiwara-Greve, Takako & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Suzuki, Nobue
- 517-525 How common are common priors?
by Hellman, Ziv & Samet, Dov
- 526-540 All-pay war
by Hodler, Roland & Yektaş, Hadi
- 541-560 Authority and communication in the laboratory
by Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung
- 561-575 Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
by Lu, Jingfeng
- 576-587 When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
by Manjunath, Vikram
- 588-600 On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge
- 601-619 Learning across games
by Mengel, Friederike
- 620-636 Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
by Noe, Thomas H. & Rebello, Michael & Wang, Jun
- 637-650 Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
by Sano, Ryuji
- 651-665 The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas
- 666-686 Optimal auctions with information acquisition
by Shi, Xianwen
- 687-698 On the accessibility of core-extensions
by Yang, Yi-You
- 699-708 A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
by Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin
- 709-713 Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties
by Wichardt, Philipp C.
2012, Volume 74, Issue 1
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