A theory of hung juries and informative voting
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Cited by:
- Liu, Shuo, 2019.
"Voting with public information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 694-719.
- Shuo Liu, 2015. "Voting with public information," ECON - Working Papers 191, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2017.
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