Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions," Discussion Papers 08-013, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
References listed on IDEAS
- Paul Milgrom, 2009.
"Assignment Messages and Exchanges,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 95-113, August.
- Paul Milgrom, 2008. "Assignment Messages and Exchanges," Discussion Papers 08-014, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990.
"Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-872, July.
- Leo K. Simon and William R. Zame., 1987. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Economics Working Papers 8756, University of California at Berkeley.
- Simon, Leo K. & Zame, William R., 1987. "Discontinous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8n46v2wv, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007.
"Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2005. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," NBER Working Papers 11765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tjalling C. Koopmans & Martin J. Beckmann, 1955. "Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 4, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
"Two-sided matching,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541,
Elsevier.
- Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, September.
- Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
- John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005.
"Matching with Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
- Paul Milgrom, 2003. "Matching with Contracts," Working Papers 03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg, 2004. "Combinatorial Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 04mit, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2004.
- William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
- Roberts, Donald John & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1976. "The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 115-127, January.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
- Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999.
"The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002.
"Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Working Papers 02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2004.
"Ascending Proxy Auctions,"
Discussion Papers
03-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2005. "Ascending Proxy Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000785, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006.
"Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
639, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom, 2006. "Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000503, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom, 2006. "Package Auctions and Package Exchanges: the 2004 Fisher-Schultz Lecture," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000131, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2023.
"Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 210-228.
- Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021. "Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples," ISER Discussion Paper 1116r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Nov 2022.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2012.
"System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
12acmhc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Paul Milgrom, 2012. "System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 10acmhc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2012.
- Jagadeesan, Ravi & Kominers, Scott Duke & Rheingans-Yoo, Ross, 2018. "Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 287-294.
- Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C., 2007.
"Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 335-366, January.
- MISHRA, Debasis & PARKES, David C., 2005. "Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Mishra, Debasis & Talman, Dolf, 2010.
"Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 6-20, January.
- Debasis Mishra & Dolf Talman, 2008. "Characterization of the walrasian equilibria of the assignment model," Discussion Papers 08-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Mishra, D. & Talman, A.J.J., 2010. "Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model," Other publications TiSEM 3e249b02-c0f4-4ccf-bd37-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005.
"Matching with Contracts,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
- Paul Milgrom, 2003. "Matching with Contracts," Working Papers 03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007.
"Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
- Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2005. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," NBER Working Papers 11765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2012. "Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley: Stable allocations and the practice of market design," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2012-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels, 2021.
"Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5317-5348, September.
- Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels, 2020. "Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management," NBER Working Papers 26873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John List & Axel Ockenfels, 2020. "Market Design, Human Behavior and Management," Artefactual Field Experiments 00685, The Field Experiments Website.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2013.
"Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 451-488, March.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Tobias B. Switzer, 2011. "Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at United States Military Academy," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 782, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom, 2007.
"Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001454, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom, 2007. "Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions," Discussion Papers 07-008, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017.
"An invitation to market design,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
- Scott Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent Crawford, 2017. "An Invitation to Market Design," Working Papers 2017-069, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- Kominers, Scott Duke & Teytelboym, Alexander & Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "An invitation to market design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3xp2110t, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carlos & Robles, Francisco, 2020. "A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 6-14.
- Raghavan, Madhav, 2020. "Influence in private-goods allocation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 14-28.
More about this item
Keywords
Sponsored search Generalized second-price auctions Mechanism design;JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:1:p:62-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.