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Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information

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  • Gershkov, Alex
  • Moldovanu, Benny

Abstract

We study the welfare maximizing assignment of several heterogeneous, commonly ranked objects to impatient agents with privately known characteristics who arrive sequentially according to a Poisson or renewal process. There is a deadline after which no more objects can be allocated. We first show that the dynamically efficient allocation, characterized by Albright [Albright, S.C., 1974. Optimal sequential assignments with random arrival times. Manage. Sci. 21 (1), 60-67], is implementable by the dynamic version of VCG mechanism. We then obtain several properties of the welfare maximizing policy using stochastic dominance measures of increased variability and majorization arguments. We also propose redistribution mechanisms that 1) implement the efficient allocation, 2) satisfy individual rationality, 3) never run a budget deficit, 4) may run a budget surplus that vanishes asymptotically.

Suggested Citation

  • Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2010. "Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 144-154, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:144-154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Guo, Mingyu & Conitzer, Vincent, 2009. "Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 69-98, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Banerjee, Shraman, 2021. "Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically," MPRA Paper 105971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    3. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    4. Anna Krasnosielska-Kobos & Elżbieta Ferenstein, 2013. "Construction of Nash Equilibrium in a Game Version of Elfving’s Multiple Stopping Problem," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 220-235, June.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said, 2010. "Dynamic Auctions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000035, David K. Levine.
    6. Dinard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2019. "Efficient Sequential Assignments with Randomly Arriving Multi-Item Demand Agents," Discussion Papers 19/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. Akan, Mustafa & Ata, Barış & Dana, James D., 2015. "Revenue management by sequential screening," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 728-774.
    8. Thomas D. Jeitschko & Pallavi Pal, 2021. "Curbing Price Fluctuations in Cap-and-Trade Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9266, CESifo.
    9. Hinnosaar, Toomas, 2017. "Calendar mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 252-270.
    10. Arieh Gavious & Ella Segev, 2017. "Price Discrimination Based on Buyers’ Purchase History," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 229-265, June.
    11. David Bergman & Jason Imbrogno, 2017. "Surviving a National Football League Survivor Pool," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(5), pages 1343-1354, October.
    12. Vahab Mirrokni & Renato Paes Leme & Pingzhong Tang & Song Zuo, 2020. "Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1939-1963, September.
    13. Loertscher, Simon & Muir, Ellen V. & Taylor, Peter G., 2022. "Optimal market thickness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    14. Arash Khatibi & Golshid Baharian & Banafsheh Behzad & Sheldon Jacobson, 2015. "Extensions of the sequential stochastic assignment problem," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 82(3), pages 317-340, December.
    15. Mallesh M. Pai & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(4), pages 682-697, November.
    16. Garrett, Daniel F., 2023. "Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 161-170.
    17. Francis Bloch & Nicolas Houy, 2012. "Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 13-33, September.
    18. Liu, Heng, 2018. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    19. Shraman Banerjee, 2024. "Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 20(2), pages 159-181, June.
    20. Santiago R. Balseiro & Huseyin Gurkan & Peng Sun, 2019. "Multiagent Mechanism Design Without Money," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 1417-1436, September.
    21. Ron Lavi & Ella Segev, 2014. "Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 791-819, November.
    22. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 283-286.

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