Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs

Citations

Cited by:

1. Robin Hanson, 2003. "For Bayesian Wannabes, Are Disagreements Not About Information?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 105-123, March.
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   • Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Other publications TiSEM 698f4897-46c6-4097-8265-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   • Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   • Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Other publications TiSEM 49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
3. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
4. ,, 2008. "Subjective expected utility in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
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5. Aviad Heifetz & Willemien Kets, 2013. "Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naiveté," Discussion Papers 1573, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
6. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2066, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Working Papers 086_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
   • Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2088, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
7. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2016. "Common belief foundations of global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 826-848.
   • Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2007. "Common Belief Foundations of Global Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001638, UCLA Department of Economics.
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8. Khrennikov, Andrei, 2015. "Quantum version of Aumann’s approach to common knowledge: Sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 89-104.
9. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2024. "The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
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    • Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2005. "On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors," MPRA Paper 4559, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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11. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 752-784, March.
    • Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2005. "Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors," MPRA Paper 14287, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    • Daisuke Oyama & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Robust equilibria under non-common priors," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754466, HAL.
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21. Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014. "Depth of reasoning and higher order beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 108-122.
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22. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
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