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p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

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  • Tercieux, Olivier

Abstract

In this paper, we use p-best response sets--a set-valued extension of p-dominance--in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information.
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  • Tercieux, Olivier, 2006. "p-Best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 371-384, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:56:y:2006:i:2:p:371-384
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi & Josef Hofbauer, 2011. "Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 251-267, September.
    2. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July.
    3. Nora, Vladyslav & Uno, Hiroshi, 2014. "Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 866-877.
    4. Barthel, Anne-Christine & Hoffmann, Eric & Sabarwal, Tarun, 2022. "Characterizing robust solutions in monotone games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 201-219.
    5. Andrea Gallice, 2013. "Equilibrium selection through pu-dominance," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 327, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    6. Pram, Kym, 2019. "On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 1-10.
    7. Kota Murayama, 2020. "Robust predictions under finite depth of reasoning," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 59-84, January.
    8. Kota Murayama, 2015. "Robust Predictions under Finite Depth of Reasoning," Discussion Paper Series DP2015-28, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.

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