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A partial-state space model of unawareness

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  • Wesley H. Holliday

Abstract

We propose a model of unawareness that remains close to the paradigm of Aumann's model for knowledge [R. J. Aumann, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999) 263-300]: just as Aumann uses a correspondence on a state space to define an agent's knowledge operator on events, we use a correspondence on a state space to define an agent's awareness operator on events. This is made possible by three ideas. First, like the model of [A. Heifetz, M. Meier, and B. Schipper, Journal of Economic Theory 130 (2006) 78-94], ours is based on a space of partial specifications of the world, partially ordered by a relation of further specification or refinement, and the idea that agents may be aware of some coarser-grained specifications while unaware of some finer-grained specifications; however, our model is based on a different implementation of this idea, related to forcing in set theory. Second, we depart from a tradition in the literature, initiated by [S. Modica and A. Rustichini, Theory and Decision 37 (1994) 107-124] and adopted by Heifetz et al. and [J. Li, Journal of Economic Theory 144 (2009) 977-993], of taking awareness to be definable in terms of knowledge. Third, we show that the negative conclusion of a well-known impossibility theorem concerning unawareness in [Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, Econometrica 66 (1998) 159-173] can be escaped by a slight weakening of a key axiom. Together these points demonstrate that a correspondence on a partial-state space is sufficient to model unawareness of events. Indeed, we prove a representation theorem showing that any abstract Boolean algebra equipped with awareness, knowledge, and belief operators satisfying some plausible axioms is representable as the algebra of events arising from a partial-state space with awareness, knowledge, and belief correspondences.

Suggested Citation

  • Wesley H. Holliday, 2024. "A partial-state space model of unawareness," Papers 2412.00897, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2412.00897
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dietrich, Franz, 2018. "Savage's theorem under changing awareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-54.
    2. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 100-121.
    3. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Rêgo, Leandro C., 2013. "Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 73-84.
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    7. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology II: Probability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 301-314.
    8. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2006. "Interactive unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 78-94, September.
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    14. Li, Jing, 2009. "Information structures with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 977-993, May.
    15. Dominiak, Adam & Tserenjigmid, Gerelt, 2022. "Ambiguity under growing awareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
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