Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105422
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- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023.
"Continuous level-k mechanism design,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 481-501.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2021. "Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design," Working Papers 2021-002, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Continuous implementation; Robust implementation; Contagion; Higher-order beliefs;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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