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The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs

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  • Chwe, Michael Suk-Young

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  • Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1999. "The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 49-71, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:87:y:1999:i:1:p:49-71
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    7. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1998. "Culture, Circles, And Commercials," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(1), pages 47-75, February.
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    3. Tatsuru Kikuchi & Toranosuke Onishi & Kenichi Ueda, 2021. "Price Stability of Cryptocurrencies as a Medium of Exchange," CARF F-Series CARF-F-526, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    4. Jones, Larry E. & Manuelli, Rodolfo E., 2001. "Volatile Policy and Private Information: The Case of Monetary Shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 99(1-2), pages 265-296, July.
    5. Isabel Schnabel & Hyun Song Shin, 2018. "Money and trust: lessons from the 1620s for money in the digital age," BIS Working Papers 698, Bank for International Settlements.

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