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Communication Protocols with Belief Messages

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  • Ryuichiro Ishikawa

Abstract

This paper presents a communication protocol to reach consensus. In our setting, every player has asymmetric information and evaluates a fixed event on his information. According to the protocol, the sender sends non-partitional messages that he believes the event with a probability of at least his evaluation. We show that the posteriors for the event must be equal among the players after the communication. Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C62, C78. Copyright Springer 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2006. "Communication Protocols with Belief Messages," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 63-74, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:1:p:63-74
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-005-6013-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
    2. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
    3. Parikh, Rohit & Krasucki, Paul, 1990. "Communication, consensus, and knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 178-189, October.
    4. Krasucki, Paul, 1996. "Protocols Forcing Consensus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 266-272, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    communication; protocol; p-belief; consensus; agreeing to disagree;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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