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Disagreement is unpredictable

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  • Hanson, Robin

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  • Hanson, Robin, 2002. "Disagreement is unpredictable," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 365-369, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:77:y:2002:i:3:p:365-369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nielsen, Lars Tyge, 1984. "Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-14, August.
    2. Robin Hanson, 1998. "Consensus By Identifying Extremists," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 293-301, June.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D & Page, Talbot, 1986. "Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 109-127, January.
    4. Neeman, Zvika, 1996. "Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Commonp-Beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 162-164, January.
    5. Nielsen, Lars Tyge, et al, 1990. "Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1235-1239, September.
    6. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robin Hanson, 2003. "For Bayesian Wannabes, Are Disagreements Not About Information?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 105-123, March.
    2. Elias Tsakas, 2011. "Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(1), pages 111-117, February.
    3. Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet," Working Papers in Economics 254, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    4. Hamed Amini & Maxim Bichuch & Zachary Feinstein, 2023. "Decentralized Prediction Markets and Sports Books," Papers 2307.08768, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.

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