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Cost Effectiveness of Conservation Auctions Revisited: The Benefits of Information Rents

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  • Wallander, Steven
  • Hellerstein, Daniel M.
  • Johnsen, Reid

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  • Wallander, Steven & Hellerstein, Daniel M. & Johnsen, Reid, 2018. "Cost Effectiveness of Conservation Auctions Revisited: The Benefits of Information Rents," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274457, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea18:274457
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274457
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    1. Keri L. Jacobs & Walter N. Thurman & Michele C. Marra, 2014. "The Effect of Conservation Priority Areas on Bidding Behavior in the Conservation Reserve Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(1), pages 1-25.
    2. Paul J. Ferraro & R. David Simpson, 2002. "The Cost-Effectiveness of Conservation Payments," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(3), pages 339-353.
    3. Wallander, Steven & Hellerstein, Daniel & Aillery, Marcel, 2013. "The Role of Conservation Program Design in Drought-Risk Adaptation," Amber Waves:The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, issue 06, pages 1-1, July.
    4. Emi Uchida & Jintao Xu & Scott Rozelle, 2005. "Grain for Green: Cost-Effectiveness and Sustainability of China’s Conservation Set-Aside Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(2).
    5. Ruben N. Lubowski & Michael J. Roberts, 2005. "How Cost-Effective Are Land Retirement Auctions? Estimating the Difference between Payments and Willingness to Accept in the Conservation Reserve Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(5), pages 1239-1247.
    6. David Zilberman, 1996. "The Economics of a Public Fund for Environmental Amenities: A Study of CRP Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 961-971.
    7. Marc N. Conte & Robert M. Griffin, 2017. "Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(3), pages 571-591.
    8. Steven Schilizzi & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, 2016. "Incentivizing and Tendering Conservation Contracts: The Trade-off between Participation and Effort Provision," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 92(2), pages 273-291.
    9. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    10. Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Xiaoyong & Marra, Michele & Levy, Armando, 2008. "Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1323-1332, November.
    11. Messer, Kent D. & Duke, Joshua M. & Lynch, Lori & Li, Tongzhe, 2017. "When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 212-226.
    12. Babcock, Bruce A. & Lakshminarayan, P. G. & Wu, J. & Zilberman, David, 1997. "Targeting Tools for the Purchase of Environmental Amenities," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5220, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel, 2010. "The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 1-17, April.
    14. Jacob R. Fooks & Kent D. Messer & Joshua M. Duke, 2015. "Dynamic Entry, Reverse Auctions, and the Purchase of Environmental Services," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 91(1), pages 57-75.
    15. Thilo W. Glebe, 2013. "Conservation Auctions: Should Information about Environmental Benefits Be Made Public?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(3), pages 590-605.
    16. Simanti Banerjee & Anthony Kwasnica & James Shortle, 2015. "Information and Auction Performance: A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 61(3), pages 409-431, July.
    17. Babcock, Bruce A. & Lakshminarayan, P. G. & Wu, JunJie & Zilberman, David, 1996. "Economics of a Public Fund for Environmental Amenities (The)," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1065, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Rolfe, John & Whitten, Stuart & Windle, Jill, 2017. "The Australian experience in using tenders for conservation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 611-620.
    19. Claassen, Roger & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert, 2008. "Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 737-752, May.
    20. Steven Wallander & Paul Ferraro & Nathaniel Higgins, 2017. "Addressing Participant Inattention in Federal Programs: A Field Experiment with The Conservation Reserve Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(4), pages 914-931.
    21. Hellerstein, Daniel M., 2017. "The US Conservation Reserve Program: The evolution of an enrollment mechanism," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 601-610.
    22. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "Auction Design for Voluntary Conservation Programs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1211-1217.
    23. Wunder, Sven & Engel, Stefanie & Pagiola, Stefano, 2008. "Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 834-852, May.
    24. Ruiqing Miao & Hongli Feng & David A. Hennessy & Xiaodong Du, 2016. "Assessing Cost-effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and Interactions between the CRP and Crop Insurance," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 92(4), pages 593-617.
    25. Marc N. Conte & Robert M. Griffin, 2017. "Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 99(3), pages 571-591, April.
    26. Wallander, Steven & Aillery, Marcel & Hellerstein, Daniel & Hand, Michael S., 2013. "The Role of Conservation Programs in Drought Risk Adaptation," Economic Research Report 262224, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
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    Keywords

    Resource and Environmental Policy Analysis; Natural Resource Economics; Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis;
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