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Cover Practice Definitions and Incentives in the Conservation Reserve Program

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  • Pratt, Bryan
  • Wallander, Steven

Abstract

The environmental benefits of the USDA Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) depend on both the environmental sensitivity of land enrolled and the conservation covers selected for that land. The CRP’s General Signup, which enrolls the majority of program acreage, uses a combination of competitive pressure and cost sharing to encourage higher quality conservation covers. In this report, we examine recent data obtained for General Signups 45, 49, and 54 (implemented in 2013, 2016, and 2020, respectively) to understand offer value and cost-share payments for cover choices. The findings in the report include identifying the most common practice choices, reporting on the average practice cost paid by the participants and USDA, how the participant's choice of cover practice responds to these costs and the incentive points associated with practices. We use our empirical results and a simple conceptual model to describe the implications of policy changes that would adjust the ranking or financial incentives to select higher quality conservation covers. The report presents evidence to suggest that the costs of cover practices—and related policy levers—impact producers decisions and, by extension, program outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Pratt, Bryan & Wallander, Steven, 2022. "Cover Practice Definitions and Incentives in the Conservation Reserve Program," USDA Miscellaneous 323862, United States Department of Agriculture.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:usdami:323862
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.323862
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter Feather & Daniel Hellerstein, 1997. "Calibrating Benefit Function Transfer to Assess the Conservation Reserve Program," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(1), pages 151-162.
    2. Marc N. Conte & Robert M. Griffin, 2017. "Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(3), pages 571-591.
    3. Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Xiaoyong & Marra, Michele & Levy, Armando, 2008. "Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1323-1332, November.
    4. Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel, 2010. "The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 1-17, April.
    5. Hellerstein, Daniel & Higgins, Nathaniel & Roberts, Michael, 2015. "Options for Improving Conservation Programs: Insights From Auction Theory and Economic Experiments," Amber Waves:The Economics of Food, Farming, Natural Resources, and Rural America, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, issue 01, pages 1-1, February.
    6. Feather, Peter & Hellerstein, Daniel & Hansen, LeRoy T., 1999. "Economic Valuation of Environmental Benefits and the Targeting of Conservation Programs: The Case of the CRP," Agricultural Economic Reports 34027, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    7. Smith, Vincent H. & Goodwin, Barry K., 2003. "An Ex Post Evaluation of the Conservation Reserve, Federal Crop Insurance, and Other Government Programs: Program Participation and Soil Erosion," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 1-16, August.
    8. Marc N. Conte & Robert M. Griffin, 2017. "Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 99(3), pages 571-591, April.
    9. Claassen, Roger & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert, 2008. "Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 737-752, May.
    10. Hellerstein, Daniel M., 2017. "The US Conservation Reserve Program: The evolution of an enrollment mechanism," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 601-610.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wallander, Steven & Paul, Laura A. & Ferraro, Paul J. & Messer, Kent D. & Iovanna, Richard, 2023. "Informational nudges in conservation auctions: A field experiment with U.S. farmers," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).

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    Keywords

    Agribusiness; Agricultural Finance; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;
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