The US Conservation Reserve Program: The evolution of an enrollment mechanism
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DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.07.017
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Keywords
Conservation reserve program; Enrollment mechanism; CRP; Auctions; Bid caps; Environmental benefits index; General signup; Reference price auction; Quota price auction;All these keywords.
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