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Big data, risk classification, and privacy in insurance markets

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Eling

    (University of St. Gallen)

  • Irina Gemmo

    (HEC Montréal)

  • Danjela Guxha

    (University of St. Gallen)

  • Hato Schmeiser

    (University of St. Gallen)

Abstract

The development of new technologies and big data analytics tools has had a profound impact on the insurance industry. A new wave of insurance economics research has emerged to study the changes and challenges those big data analytics developments engendered on the insurance industry. We provide a comprehensive literature review on big data, risk classification, and privacy in insurance markets, and discuss avenues for future research. Our study is complemented by an application of the use of big data in risk classification, considering individuals' privacy preferences. We propose a framework for analyzing the trade-off between the accuracy of risk classification and the discount offered to policyholders as an incentive to share private data. Furthermore, we discuss the conditions under which using policyholders' private data to classify risks more accurately is profitable for an insurer. In particular, we find that improving the accuracy of risk classification, if achieved by requiring the use of private data, does not necessarily provide an incentive for insurers to create more granular risk classes.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Eling & Irina Gemmo & Danjela Guxha & Hato Schmeiser, 2024. "Big data, risk classification, and privacy in insurance markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 49(1), pages 75-126, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:49:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1057_s10713-024-00098-5
    DOI: 10.1057/s10713-024-00098-5
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Big data; Digitalization; Privacy costs; Risk classification;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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