Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets
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DOI: j.1540-6296.2005.00057.x
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Francesca Barigozzi & Dominique Henriet, 2006. "Endogenous Information and Self-Insurance in Insurance Markets : a Welfare Analysis," Working Papers halshs-00411337, HAL.
- Maureen Durnin & Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2012. "Genetic Testing and Insurance: The Complexity of Adverse Selection," Working Papers 1208, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- M. Martin Boyer & Franca Glenzer, 2021. "Pensions, annuities, and long-term care insurance: on the impact of risk screening," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 46(2), pages 133-174, September.
- Amegashie, A., 2008. "Socially-Tolerable Discrimination," Working Papers 0806, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Filipova-Neumann, Lilia & Hoy, Michael, 2014. "Managing genetic tests, surveillance, and preventive medicine under a public health insurance system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 31-41.
- Mimra, Wanda & Nemitz, Janina & Waibel, Christian, 2020. "Voluntary pooling of genetic risk: A health insurance experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 864-882.
- Michael Hoy & Richard Peter & Andreas Richter, 2014. "Take-up for genetic tests and ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 111-133, April.
- Karlsson Linnér, Richard & Koellinger, Philipp D., 2022. "Genetic risk scores in life insurance underwriting," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
- Francesca Barigozzi & Dominique Henriet, 2011.
"Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches When Prevention Matters,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 23-46, February.
- Francesca Barigozzi & Dominique Henriet, 2008. "Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches when Prevention Matters," CHILD Working Papers wp01_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- F. Barigozzi & D. Henriet, 2009. "Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches when Prevention Matters," Working Papers 657, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Martin Eling & Martin Lehmann, 2018. "The Impact of Digitalization on the Insurance Value Chain and the Insurability of Risks," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 359-396, July.
- Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2008. "Socially-Tolerable Discrimination," MPRA Paper 8543, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martin Eling & Irina Gemmo & Danjela Guxha & Hato Schmeiser, 2024. "Big data, risk classification, and privacy in insurance markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 49(1), pages 75-126, March.
- David Crainich, 2017.
"Self-Insurance With Genetic Testing Tools,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, March.
- David Crainich, 2015. "Self-Insurance With Genetic Testing Tools," Post-Print hal-01533549, HAL.
- Wanda Mimra & Janina Nemitz & Christian Waibel, 2019. "Voluntary pooling of genetic risk: A health insurance experiment," Post-Print hal-02499086, HAL.
- Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Lehmann, Martin, 2020. "Balancing the desire for privacy against the desire to hedge risk," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 608-620.
- Xavier Landes, 2015. "How Fair Is Actuarial Fairness?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 519-533, May.
- Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2008. "“No Solution to This Dilemma Exists”: Discrimination, Insurance, and the Human Genome Project," Working Papers 0808, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
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