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Auswirkungen von Gentests in der Krankenversicherung

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  • Christine Arentz

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  • Christine Arentz, 2012. "Auswirkungen von Gentests in der Krankenversicherung," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 04/2012, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    • Handle: RePEc:kln:owiwdp:dp_04_2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 768-779.
    2. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    3. Angus Macdonald & Pradip Tapadar, 2010. "Multifactorial Genetic Disorders and Adverse Selection: Epidemiology Meets Economics," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 155-182, March.
    4. Oster, Emily & Shoulson, Ira & Quaid, Kimberly & Dorsey, E. Ray, 2010. "Genetic adverse selection: Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1041-1050, December.
    5. Francesca Barigozzi & Dominique Henriet, 2011. "Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches When Prevention Matters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 23-46, February.
    6. repec:adr:anecst:y:2006:i:83-84:p:14 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Christine Arentz & Johann Eekhoff & Susanna Kochskämper, 2012. "Private health insurance: a role model for European health systems," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(5), pages 615-621, October.
    8. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-344, April.
    9. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March.
    10. Kaufert, Patricia A., 2000. "Health policy and the new genetics," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 51(6), pages 821-829, September.
    11. Hall, Jane, 1996. "Consumer utility, social welfare, and genetic testing. A response to "Genetic testing: an economic and contractarian analysis"," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 377-380, June.
    12. Kifmann, Mathias, 2002. "Community rating in health insurance and different benefit packages," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 719-737, September.
    13. Diego Ossa & Adrian Towse, 2004. "Genetic screening, health care and the insurance industry," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 5(2), pages 116-121, May.
    14. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    15. Maureen Durnin & Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2012. "Genetic Testing and Insurance: The Complexity of Adverse Selection," Working Papers 1208, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    16. Zweifel, Peter & Breuer, Michael, 2006. "The case for risk-based premiums in public health insurance," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 171-188, April.
    17. Anne-Fleur Roos & Frederik Schut, 2012. "Spillover effects of supplementary on basic health insurance: evidence from the Netherlands," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(1), pages 51-62, February.
    18. Casey Rothschild, 2011. "The Efficiency of Categorical Discrimination in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 267-285, June.
    19. Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon, 2006. "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 847-860, September.
    20. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
    21. Ray Rees & Patricia Apps, 2006. "Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance Markets," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 83-84, pages 353-368.
    22. Markus Jankowski & Anne Zimmermann, 2003. "Wettbewerb ohne Risikoselektion auf dem deutschen Krankenversicherungsmarkt," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2003, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    23. Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor, 2002. "Genetic testing when there is a mix of compulsory and voluntary health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 253-270, March.
    24. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    25. Sandberg, Per, 1995. "Genetic information and life insurance: A proposal for an ethical European policy," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 40(11), pages 1549-1559, June.
    26. David Crainich, 2017. "Self-Insurance With Genetic Testing Tools," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, March.
    27. Pauly, Mark V., 1984. "Is cream-skimming a problem for the competitive medical market?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 87-95, April.
    28. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    29. Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, 2008. "“No Solution to This Dilemma Exists”: Discrimination, Insurance, and the Human Genome Project," Working Papers 0808, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    30. Michael Hoy & Fabienne Orsi & François Eisinger & Jean Paul Moatti, 2003. "The Impact of Genetic Testing on Healthcare Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 28(2), pages 203-221, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ines Läufer, 2014. "Das Krankenversicherungssystem in den USA: Bestimmungsparameter des Angebots und der Ausgestaltungformen von Arbeitgeber-Gruppenversicherungen," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2014, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    2. Christine Arentz, 2013. "Unisex-Tarife in der Krankenversicherung - Folgen für die deutsche private Krankenversicherung und das Reformkonzept der Bürgerversicherung," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 02/2013, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    3. Ines Läufer, 2014. "Unvollständige Absicherung des Krankheitskostenrisikos in den USA: Erklärungsfaktoren der Attraktivität von Arbeitgeber-Gruppenversicherungen," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 01/2014, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.

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