Content
2012
- 19-91 Review of Paradoxes Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate
In: Electoral Systems
by Dan S. Felsenthal - 93-127 Election Inversions by the U.S. Electoral College
In: Electoral Systems
by Nicholas R. Miller - 129-150 Which Voting Rule Minimizes the Probability of the Referendum Paradox? Lessons from French Data
In: Electoral Systems
by Rahhal Lahrach & Vincent Merlin - 151-171 A Gentle Combination of Plurality Vote and Proportional Representation for Bundestag Elections
In: Electoral Systems
by Olga Birkmeier & Kai-Friederike Oelbermann & Friedrich Pukelsheim & Matthias Rossi - 173-199 The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences
In: Electoral Systems
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 201-216 The Impact of Group Coherence on the Condorcet Ranking Efficiency of Voting Rules
In: Electoral Systems
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 217-251 Modeling the Outcomes of Vote-Casting in Actual Elections
In: Electoral Systems
by T. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann - 255-274 On the Relevance of Theoretical Results to Voting System Choice
In: Electoral Systems
by Hannu Nurmi - 275-303 Putting Paradoxes into Perspective: in Defence of the Alternative Vote
In: Electoral Systems
by Ken Ritchie & Alessandro Gardini - 305-326 Approval Balloting for Fixed-Size Committees
In: Electoral Systems
by D. Marc Kilgour & Erica Marshall - 327-351 And the Loser Is… Plurality Voting
In: Electoral Systems
by Jean-François Laslier
2011
- 1-18 An Introduction to Social Ethics and Normative Economics
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles & John A. Weymark - 1-47 Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 19-56 Kolm as a Contributor to Public Utility Pricing, Second-Best Culture, and the Theory of Regulation
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Laurent David & Michel Breton & Olivier Merillon - 49-79 Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 57-99 Public Utility Pricing and Capacity Choice with Stochastic Demand
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Laurent David & Michel Breton & Olivier Merillon - 81-121 Other Incompatibility Paradoxes
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 101-127 Bidimensional Inequalities with an Ordinal Variable
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Nicolas Gravel & Patrick Moyes - 123-155 Other Voting Paradoxes
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 129-154 Inequality of Life Chances and the Measurement of Social Immobility
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Jacques Silber & Amedeo Spadaro - 155-167 Partnership, Solidarity, and Minimal Envy in Matching Problems
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Koichi Tadenuma - 157-198 Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 169-191 Borrowing-Proofness of the Lindahl Rule in Kolm Triangle Economies
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by William Thomson - 193-216 When Kolm Meets Mirrlees: ELIE
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy - 199-247 Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 217-239 Kolm’s Tax, Tax Credit, and the Flat Tax
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet - 241-259 Positional Equity and Equal Sacrifice: Design Principles for an EU-Wide Income Tax?
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Peter J. Lambert - 249-294 Other Characteristics of Voting Rules
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 261-277 Comparing Societies with Different Numbers of Individuals on the Basis of Their Average Advantage
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Nicolas Gravel & Thierry Marchant & Arunava Sen - 279-301 On Kolm’s Use of Epistemic Counterfactuals in Social Choice Theory
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by John A. Weymark - 295-329 The Significance of Voting Rule Selection
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley - 303-325 Optimal Redistribution in the Distributive Liberal Social Contract
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Jean Mercier Ythier - 327-337 Reciprocity and Norms
In: Social Ethics and Normative Economics
by Jon Elster - 331-366 Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies
In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
by William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley
2010
- 1-12 Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver - 3-6 Introduction to Part I
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 7-20 Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 15-17 Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Charles Girard - 19-37 Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Steven J. Brams & Peter C. Fishburn - 21-43 Nash consistent representations
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 41-90 Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Biung-Ghi Ju - 45-57 Acceptable representations
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 59-66 Strongly consistent representations
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 67-79 Nash consistent representation through lottery models
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 81-94 On the continuity of representations of constitutions
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 91-102 Axiomatizations of Approval Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Yongsheng Xu - 97-103 Introduction to Part II
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 105-112 Feasible elimination procedures
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 105-124 Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by D. Marc Kilgour - 113-121 Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 123-145 Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
In: Strategic Social Choice
by Bezalel Peleg & Hans Peters - 125-150 Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé - 153-163 The Basic Approval Voting Game
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver - 165-197 Approval Voting in Large Electorates
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Matías Núñez - 199-251 Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Dorothea Baumeister & Gábor Erdélyi & Edith Hemaspaandra & Lane A. Hemaspaandra & Jörg Rothe - 255-283 On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin & Fabrice Valognes - 285-310 Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Aki Lehtinen - 311-335 In Silico Voting Experiments
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Jean-François Laslier - 339-356 Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Jean-François Laslier - 357-395 Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim - 397-411 Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Carlos Alós–Ferrer & Ðura-Georg Granić - 415-429 Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Jean-François Laslier & François Maniquet - 431-451 Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Arnaud Dellis - 455-468 Describing Society Through Approval Data
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by Jean-François Laslier - 469-481 Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
In: Handbook on Approval Voting
by M. Remzi Sanver
2009
- 5-25 Entropy-Related Measures of the Utility of Gambling
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by R. Duncan Luce & Anthony J. Marley & Che Tat Ng - 27-38 Altruistic Utility Functions for Joint Decisions
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by David E. Bell & Ralph L. Keeney - 39-55 SSB Preferences: Nonseparable Utilities or Nonseparable Beliefs
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Yutaka Nakamura - 59-72 Decision Making Based on Risk-Value Tradeoffs
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Jianmin Jia & James S. Dyer - 73-83 Normally Distributed Admissible Choices are Optimal
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by James N. Bodurtha & Qi Shen - 85-109 A Conjoint Measurement Approach to the Discrete Sugeno Integral
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Denis Bouyssou & Thierry Marchant & Marc Pirlot - 113-133 Additive Representability of Finite Measurement Structures
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Arkadii Slinko - 139-160 Acyclic Domains of Linear Orders: A Survey
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Bernard Monjardet - 161-182 Condorcet Domains: A Geometric Perspective
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Donald G. Saari - 183-196 Condorcet's Paradox with Three Candidates
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by William V. Gehrlein - 197-211 On the Probability to Act in the European Union
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Marc R. Feix & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin & Jean-Louis Rouet - 215-237 Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver - 239-258 Anonymous Voting Rules with Abstention: Weighted Voting
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by William S. Zwicker - 261-270 Pareto, Anonymity or Neutrality, but Not IIA: Countably Many Alternatives
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly - 273-285 Bruhat Orders and the Sequential Selection of Indivisible Items
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Brian Hopkins & Michael A. Jones - 291-301 Fractional Weak Discrepancy of Posets and Certain Forbidden Configurations
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Alan Shuchat & Randy Shull & Ann N. Trenk - 303-311 Interval Order Representation via Shortest Paths
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Garth Isaak - 313-322 Probe Interval Orders
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by David E. Brown & Larry J. Langley - 325-343 Mediatic Graphs
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Jean-Claude Falmagne & Sergei Ovchinnikov - 345-352 An Application of Stahl's Conjecture About the k-Tuple Chromatic Numbers of Kneser Graphs
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Svata Poljak & Fred S. Roberts - 355-360 Optimal Reservation Scheme Routing for Two-Rate Wide-Sense Nonblocking Three-Stage Clos Networks
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Wenqing Dou & Frank K. Hwang - 361-369 Correlation Inequalities for Partially Ordered Algebras
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Siddhartha Sahi - 371-391 The Kruskal Count
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Jeffrey C. Lagarias & Eric Rains & Robert J. Vanderbei - 393-402 Descending Dungeons and Iterated Base-Changing
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by David Applegate & Marc Brun & N. J. A. Sloane - 403-420 Updating Hardy, Littlewood and Pólya with Linear Programming
In: The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
by Larry Shepp
2008
- 11-23 Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Maurice Salles - 25-33 Harmless Homotopic Dictators
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Nicholas Baigent - 35-41 Remarks on Population Ethics
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Tomoichi Shinotsuka - 43-67 On Non-Welfarist Social Ordering Functions
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Naoki Yoshihara - 71-94 Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Yves Sprumont - 95-118 To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Marc Fleurbaey - 119-138 Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Koichi Tadenuma - 139-155 Characterization of the Maximin Choice Function in a Simple Dynamic Economy
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Koichi Suga & Daisuke Udagawa - 159-179 Suzumura Consistency
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Walter Bossert - 181-193 On the Microtheoretic Foundations of Cagan’s Demand for Money Function
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Rajat Deb & Kaushal Kishore & Tae Kun Seo - 195-213 Hicksian Surplus Measures of Individual Welfare Change When There is Price and Income Uncertainty
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson & John A. Weymark - 215-233 Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Peter J. Hammond - 237-258 Unemployment and Vulnerability: A Class of Distribution Sensitive Measures, its Axiomatic Properties, and Applications
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Kaushik Basu & Patrick Nolen - 259-269 Ordinal Distance, Dominance, and the Measurement of Diversity
In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare
by Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu
2006
- 1-18 Power Indices Taking into Account Agents’ Preferences
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Fuad Aleskerov - 19-41 The Sunfish Against the Octopus: Opposing Compactness to Gerrymandering
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Nicola Apollonio & Ronald I. Becker & Isabella Lari & Federica Ricca & Bruno Simeone - 43-53 Apportionment: Uni- and Bi-Dimensional
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Michel Balinski - 55-64 Minimum Total Deviation Apportionments
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Paul H. Edelman - 65-81 Comparison of Electoral Systems: Simulative and Game Theoretic Approaches
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Vito Fragnelli & Guido Ortona - 83-95 How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by D. Marc Kilgour & Steven J. Brams & M. Remzi Sanver - 97-104 On Some Distance Aspects in Social Choice Theory
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Christian Klamler - 105-116 Algorithms for Biproportional Apportionment
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Sebastian Maier - 117-132 Distance from Consensus: A Theme and Variations
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Tommi Meskanen & Hannu Nurmi - 133-150 A Strategic Problem in Approval Voting
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Jack H. Nagel - 151-165 The Italian Bug: A Flawed Procedure for Bi-Proportional Seat Allocation
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Aline Pennisi - 167-176 Current Issues of Apportionment Methods
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Friedrich Pukelsheim - 177-188 A Gentle Majority Clause for the Apportionment of Committee Seats
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Friedrich Pukelsheim & Sebastian Maier - 189-204 Allotment According to Preferential Vote: Ecuador’s Elections
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Victoriano Ramírez - 205-220 Degressively Proportional Methods for the Allotment of the European Parliament Seats Amongst the EU Member States
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Victoriano Ramírez & Antonio Palomares & Maria L. Márquez - 221-234 Hidden Mathematical Structures of Voting
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Donald G. Saari - 235-251 A Comparison of Electoral Formulae for the Faroese Parliament
In: Mathematics and Democracy
by Petur Zachariassen & Martin Zachariassen
2005
- 1-14 Introduction and Overview
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by David Austen-Smith & John Duggan - 15-56 Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan - 57-91 Local Political Equilibria
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Norman Schofield - 93-112 Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey - 113-130 Party Objectives in the “Divide a Dollar” Electoral Competition
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Jean-François Laslier - 131-162 Generalized Bandit Problems
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Rangarajan K. Sundaram - 163-199 The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Breton - 201-226 Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Daniel Diermeier & Rebecca Morton - 227-247 Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Randall L. Calvert & Nathan Dietz - 249-268 Testing Theories of Lawmaking
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by Keith Krehbiel & Adam Meirowitz & Jonathan Woon - 269-316 Deliberation and Voting Rules
In: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions
by David Austen-Smith & Timothy Feddersen