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To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem

In: Rational Choice and Social Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Fleurbaey

    (CERSES, CNRS and University Paris Descartes
    IDEP)

Abstract

The envy test concept is an all-or-nothing notion, and this is problematic when there is no achievable envy-free option. The idea of ranking the ‘unfair’ social states on the basis of how much envy they contain goes back at least to Feldman and Kirman (1974) and Varian (1976), but it is in Suzumura (1981a, b, 1983) that one finds a first systematic study of this issue. More recent contributions to this line of research include Chauduri (1986), Diamantaras and Thomson (1990), Tadenuma (2002), and Tadenuma and Thomson (1995).

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Fleurbaey, 2008. "To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Koichi Tadenuma & Yongsheng Xu & Naoki Yoshihara (ed.), Rational Choice and Social Welfare, pages 95-118, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-79832-3_6
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79832-3_6
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    Cited by:

    1. Lloret-Batlle, Roger & Jayakrishnan, R., 2016. "Envy-minimizing pareto efficient intersection control with brokered utility exchanges under user heterogeneity," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 22-42.
    2. Norihito Sakamoto, 2013. "No-envy, efficiency, and collective rationality," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1033-1045, April.
    3. Sakamoto, Norihito & 坂本, 徳仁, 2011. "No-Envy, Efficiency, and Collective Rationality," Discussion Papers 2011-08, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

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