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Approval Balloting for Fixed-Size Committees

In: Electoral Systems

Author

Listed:
  • D. Marc Kilgour

    (Wilfrid Laurier University)

  • Erica Marshall

    (Wilfrid Laurier University)

Abstract

Approval voting is a well-known voting procedure for single-winner elections. Voters approve as many candidates as they like; a candidate wins if and only if no other candidate receives more approvals (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983, 2005). But approval votes can be aggregated in different ways to serve different purposes, so it is reasonable to distinguish between approval balloting, in which each voter submits a ballot that identifies the voter’s approved candidates, and approval voting, the single-winner procedure that selects the most-approved candidate(s) (Merrill and Nagel 1987).

Suggested Citation

  • D. Marc Kilgour & Erica Marshall, 2012. "Approval Balloting for Fixed-Size Committees," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover (ed.), Electoral Systems, chapter 0, pages 305-326, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-20441-8_12
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_12
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2018. "The Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the k-Scoring Rules: Agreement and Condorcet Committee Consistency," Working Papers hal-01757761, HAL.
    3. Markus Brill & Jean-François Laslier & Piotr Skowron, 2018. "Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(3), pages 358-382, July.
    4. Edith Elkind & Piotr Faliszewski & Piotr Skowron & Arkadii Slinko, 2017. "Properties of multiwinner voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 599-632, March.
    5. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
    6. Markus Brill & Paul Gölz & Dominik Peters & Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin & Kai Wilker, 2022. "Approval-based apportionment," Post-Print hal-03816043, HAL.
    7. Begoña Subiza & Josep E. Peris, 2017. "A Representative Committee by Approval Balloting," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(5), pages 1029-1040, September.
    8. Subiza, Begoña & Peris, Josep E., 2014. "A Consensual Committee Using Approval Balloting," QM&ET Working Papers 14-5, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    9. Duddy, Conal, 2014. "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 14-16.
    10. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.
    11. Haris Aziz & Markus Brill & Vincent Conitzer & Edith Elkind & Rupert Freeman & Toby Walsh, 2017. "Justified representation in approval-based committee voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 461-485, February.
    12. Chris Dong & Patrick Lederer, 2023. "Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules," Papers 2302.11890, arXiv.org.
    13. Martin Lackner & Jan Maly, 2020. "Approval-Based Shortlisting," Papers 2005.07094, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    14. Hannu Nurmi, 2014. "Some remarks on the concept of proportionality," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 215(1), pages 231-244, April.

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