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Axiomatizations of Approval Voting

In: Handbook on Approval Voting

Author

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  • Yongsheng Xu

    (Georgia State University)

Abstract

There has been a number of axiomatic studies of approval voting since its introduction by Brams and Fishburn (1978). The axiomatic characterizations of approval voting have given researchers a better understanding of the structure of approval voting, and have made the pros and cons of approval voting much sharper. In this article, we present a survey of various axiomatic characterizations of approval voting that are there in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Yongsheng Xu, 2010. "Axiomatizations of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 91-102, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-02839-7_5
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_5
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2017. "Ranking languages in the European Union: Before and after Brexit," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 139-151.
    2. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Working Papers hal-03614585, HAL.
    3. Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 299-320, October.
    4. Uuganbaatar Ninjbat, 2013. "Approval Voting without Faithfulness," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 015-020, March.
    5. Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers halshs-02440615, HAL.
    6. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    7. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 169-205, July.
    8. François Maniquet & Philippe Mongin, 2015. "Approval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 519-532, March.
    9. Komatsu, Hiroyuki, 2024. "Characterizations of approval ranking," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 18-24.
    10. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes, 2019. "Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 388-401.
    11. Trevor Leach & Robert C. Powers, 2020. "Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(4), pages 639-655, April.
    12. Fujun Hou, 2024. "A new social welfare function with a number of desirable properties," Papers 2403.16373, arXiv.org.
    13. Eric Kamwa, 2018. "On the Condorcet Efficiency of the Preference Approval Voting and the Probability of Selecting the Condorcet Loser," Working Papers hal-01786121, HAL.
    14. José Alcantud & Annick Laruelle, 2014. "Dis&approval voting: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10, June.

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