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Which Voting Rule Minimizes the Probability of the Referendum Paradox? Lessons from French Data

In: Electoral Systems

Author

Listed:
  • Rahhal Lahrach

    (Mohammed First University-EST Oujda, Université Mohammed Premier)

  • Vincent Merlin

    (CREM, Université de Caen Basse Normandie and CNRS)

Abstract

Amajor goal of democracy is to achieve equal representation of the citizens. Though equal representation can be easily achieved when all the voters directly select a president or decide on a policy through a referendum, the issue is not that simple for indirect democracy. A crucial question thus relates to the choice of the “best” two-tier voting rules. More precisely, how many mandates should be allocated to each jurisdiction (examples being electoral constituencies, local jurisdictions, regions, states, countries) in this type of system? Which quota should be used for decision? Very different answers to these questions were adopted by the various federal structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Rahhal Lahrach & Vincent Merlin, 2012. "Which Voting Rule Minimizes the Probability of the Referendum Paradox? Lessons from French Data," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover (ed.), Electoral Systems, chapter 0, pages 129-150, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-20441-8_5
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_5
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    2. Dominique Lepelley & Vincent R Merlin & Jean-louis Rouet & Laurent Vidu, 2014. "Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(4), pages 2201-2207.
    3. Herrade Igersheim & François Durand & Aaron Hamlin & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "Comparing Voting Methods : 2016 US Presidential Election," Working Papers halshs-01972097, HAL.
    4. Herrade Igersheim & François Durand & Aaron Hamlin & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "Comparing Voting Methods : 2016 US Presidential Election," PSE Working Papers halshs-01972097, HAL.
    5. Dominique Lepelley, 2021. "Remarques sur le mode d'élection des conseillers départementaux," Post-Print hal-03546568, HAL.

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