IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sochwe/v14y1996i1p47-56.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies

Author

Listed:
  • James Schummer

    (Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA)

Abstract

Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this "small" domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou's.

Suggested Citation

  • James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:47-56
    Note: Received: 9 June 1995/Accepted: 8 January 1996
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/6014001/60140047.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/6014001/60140047.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006. "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 305-331, April.
    3. James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Cho, Wonki Jo, 2014. "Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 26-39.
    5. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June.
    6. Ryan Tierney, 2016. "On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules," ISER Discussion Paper 0987, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    7. Pablo Amorós, 2002. "Single-peaked preferences with several commodities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(1), pages 57-67.
    8. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    9. Thomson, William, 2005. "Divide-and-permute," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 186-200, July.
    10. Manjunath, Vikram, 2016. "Fractional matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 321-336.
    11. , Prabal & , & ,, 2014. "Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    12. Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
    13. Leroux, Jistin, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency Are Incompatible in Production Economies," Working Papers 2004-07, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    14. Tierney, Ryan, 2019. "On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    15. Ju, Biung-Ghi, 2005. "Strategy-proof risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-254, February.
    16. William Thomson, 2007. "Children Crying at Birthday Parties. Why?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 501-521, June.
    17. Nikhil Garg & Ashish Goel & Benjamin Plaut, 2021. "Markets for public decision-making," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 755-801, May.
    18. Papai, Szilvia, 2003. "Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 931-959, November.
    19. Ashish Goel & Reyna Hulett & Benjamin Plaut, 2018. "Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities," Papers 1807.05293, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2019.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:47-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.