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Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem

Author

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  • Vincenzo DenicolÔ

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, UniversitÁ di Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli, 2, I-40125 Bologna, Italy)

Abstract

I show that the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Arrow's impossibility theorem can be weakened into Relational Independent Decisiveness. The condition of Relational Independent Decisiveness is essentially a translation of Sen's Independent Decisiveness into the traditional Arrovian framework. I also show by example that Relational Independent Decisiveness is indeed weaker than Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincenzo DenicolÔ, 1998. "Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 563-566.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:563-566
    Note: Received: 30 October 1996 / Accepted: 22 May 1997
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Vannucci, 2022. "Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem," Papers 2210.03200, arXiv.org.
    2. Ceyhun Coban & M. Sanver, 2014. "Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 953-961, December.
    3. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2003. "A necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson's impossibility theorem with strict non-imposition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8.

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