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Voting paradoxes and referenda

Author

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  • Hannu Nurmi

    (Department of Political Science, University of Turku, FIN-20014 Turku, Finland)

Abstract

In representational democracies the referenda constitute an additional way for the voters to express their opinions. At the same time they are accompanied by problems of agenda manipulation and interpretation of results. In this context various voting paradoxes and their interrelationships are of considerable interest. In this article particular attention is paid to opinion aggregation paradoxes in referendum institutions. The limits and interrelationships of paradoxes are discussed. Some ways of avoiding paradoxical situations are also outlined.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannu Nurmi, 1998. "Voting paradoxes and referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 333-350.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:15:y:1998:i:3:p:333-350
    Note: Received: 11 September 1995 / Accepted: 7 January 1997
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    Cited by:

    1. Marek M. Kaminski, 2015. "Empirical examples of voting paradoxes," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 20, pages 367-387, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Laine, 2017. "The strong referendum paradox," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1707-1731, July.
    3. Fabrice Barthelemy & Mathieu Martin & Ashley Piggins, 2011. "U.S Presidential Elections and the Referendum Paradox," THEMA Working Papers 2011-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    4. Hannu Nurmi, 2001. "Resolving Group Choice Paradoxes Using Probabilistic and Fuzzy Concepts," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 177-199, March.
    5. Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2023. "Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 221-262, August.
    6. Laffond, G. & Laine, J., 2006. "Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 49-66, July.
    7. Sanne Zwart, 2010. "Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 643-677, April.
    8. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.
    9. Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
    10. Kurz, Sascha & Maaser, Nicola & Napel, Stefan, 2018. "Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 152-161.
    11. Sanne Zwart, 2007. "Fixing the Quorum: Representation versus Abstention," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/07, European University Institute.
    12. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
    13. Shanti P. Chakravarty, 2018. "Democratic Participation," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 235-254, September.
    14. Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu Martin & Ashley Piggins, 2017. "Trump’s victory like Harrison, not Hayes and Bush," THEMA Working Papers 2017-22, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    15. Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. & Ulungu, Berthold E.-L., 2014. "On analysis and characterization of the mean-median compromise method," MPRA Paper 64154, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2014.
    16. Clark Bowman & Jonathan Hodge & Ada Yu, 2014. "The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 111-124, June.
    17. Simon Hug, 2009. "Some thoughts about referendums, representative democracy, and separation of powers," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 251-266, September.
    18. Ming Tang & Huchang Liao, 2023. "Group Structure and Information Distribution on the Emergence of Collective Intelligence," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 20(2), pages 133-150, June.
    19. Laffond, Gilbert & Laine, Jean, 2000. "Representation in majority tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 35-53, January.
    20. Søberg, Morten & Tangerås, Thomas P., 2003. "Voter Turnout in Direct Democracy: Theory and Evidence," Working Paper Series 596, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    21. Daniel Bochsler, 2010. "The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 119-131, July.
    22. Giuseppe Pignataro & Giovanni Prarolo, 2020. "Learning, proximity and voting: theory and empirical evidence from nuclear referenda," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 117-147, June.
    23. Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Pyramidal Democracy," MPRA Paper 3965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. Marc Pauly, 2013. "Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 581-597, October.

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