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Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods

Author

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  • Koichi Tadenuma

    (Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186, Japan)

Abstract

In most of the recent literature on fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods and a single infinitely divisible good, it is assumed that each agent can consume at most one indivisible good. In this paper, we show that if this assumption is dropped, there do not necessarily exist envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations. However, envy-free allocations still exist and so do Pareto efficient allocations. Hence, a trade-off between equity and efficiency arises.

Suggested Citation

  • Koichi Tadenuma, 1996. "Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(4), pages 445-450.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:13:y:1996:i:4:p:445-450
    Note: Received: 17 February 1995/Accepted: 16 June 1995
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    Cited by:

    1. Banerjee, Sreoshi, 2023. "Stability and fairness in sequencing games: optimistic approach and pessimistic scenarios," MPRA Paper 118680, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Maniquet, Francois, 2003. "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 90-103, March.
    3. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    4. Kranich, Laurence, 2015. "Equal shadow wealth: A new concept of fairness in exchange economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 110-117.
    5. Satoshi Nakada, 2018. "Envy-free allocation of indivisible goods with money and externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 52-59.
    6. Duygu Yengin, 2017. "No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 81-108, January.

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